THE BRITISH BOER WAR AND THE FRENCH ALGERIAN CONFLICT COUNTERINSURGENCY FOR TODAY

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Military historical case studies provide insight for military planners. Military planners cannot afford to ignore history when planning in today's complex environment. This thesis analyzes military doctrinal changes and adaptation during Britain's Boer War and the French counterinsurgency war in Algeria. The Boer War serves as an example of doctrinal change during a counterinsurgency campaign. The French experience demonstrates the difficult task of fighting against an ambiguous enemy who uses terrorism as its primary tactic. A counterinsurgency comparison and analysis focuses on three issues present in both case studies: population control measures, operational tactics, and the civil military operations. The conclusion offers solutions to the military situation today based on the British and French counterinsurgency. This thesis argues history provides US military planners with the background to develop a successful counterinsurgency strategy for today's environment.

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ABSTRACT

THE BRITISH BOER WAR AND THE FRENCH ALGERIAN CONFLICT: COUNTERINSURGENCY FOR TODAY, by MAJ Mike Lackman, 96 pages.

Military historical case studies provide insight for military planners. Military planners cannot afford to ignore history when planning in today's complex environment. This thesis analyzes military doctrinal changes and adaptation during Britain's Boer War and the French counterinsurgency war in Algeria.

The Boer War serves as an example of doctrinal change during a counterinsurgency campaign. The French experience demonstrates the difficult task of fighting against an ambiguous enemy who uses terrorism as its primary tactic. A counterinsurgency comparison and analysis focuses on three issues present in both case studies: population control measures, operational tactics, and the civil military operations. The conclusion offers solutions to the military situation today based on the British and French counterinsurgency. This thesis argues history provides US military planners with the background to develop a successful counterinsurgency strategy for today's environment.

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INTRODUCTION

> But the conditions of small wars are so diversified, the enemy's mode of fighting is often so peculiar, and the theatres of operations present such singular features, that irregular warfare must generally be carried out on a method totally different from the stereotyped system. The art of war, as generally understood, must be modified to suit the circumstances of each particular case.[1]
>
> Colonel C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars*

Colonel Callwell began his service to the British army in 1878 and participated in England's Imperial wars during his tenure. His book stands among the classic military writings about small war tactics. He understood the nature of counterinsurgency operations. Small wars require adaptability, flexibility, and initiative from leaders and planners. Conventional doctrine fails to provide a suitable model from which to develop a counterinsurgency strategy. Callwell understood the diversity and unique nature of small wars. Also, he discerned the importance of incorporating the lessons from past wars into current and future operations.

Military historical case studies provide a level of knowledge for military planners. Case studies provoke discussion, aid staff training, and provide lessons learned. Military planners cannot afford to ignore the lessons of history when planning operations in today's complex environment. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the change in doctrine of the British in the Boer War of 1899 and the French counterinsurgency operations in Algeria. This thesis uses the government's perspective to derive the doctrinal changes and lessons learned in each case. A model helps explain the

relationship between opposing forces. A counterinsurgency model serves as the framework for the analysis, explanations, and conclusions.

The Counterinsurgency Model

War affects society. The action or inaction of military or paramilitary force influences popular support. The public bears the consequences or reaps the benefits of military action. Counterinsurgency strategy balances the requirements of civil rights and security. Clausewitz's described three factors of war in his book, *On War*, "These three tendencies are like three codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another."[2] Although Clausewitz's comments referred to commanders, governments, and people, the trinity applies to a counterinsurgency war. The model provides a simple framework to discuss the interaction among the forces of an insurgency. Mao understood the importance of the winning the support of the people in a revolutionary war. He said, "The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to inhabitants of guerilla zones and their national consciousness awakened."[3] A successful counterinsurgency campaign accounts for each leg of the triangle with the goal of creating legitimacy and building the support of the population. Figure 1 depicts the counterinsurgency (COIN) model.

Governmental actions represent the most significant force during counterinsurgency operations. If the government can effectively synchronize the elements of national power, the insurgency usually fails. As Bard O'Neill wrote in *Insurgency and Terrorism*, "Of all the variables that have a bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgencies, none is more important than government response."[4] The government

possesses the most assets and strengths. Yet, bureaucracies hinder decision-making and implementation of strategy.



Figure 1. COIN Model
Source: Carl von Clausewitz, *On War (*Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89; and Janeen Klinger, "The Social Science of Carl von Clausewitz," *Parameters* 36, no. 1 (spring 2006): 86.

Time is on the side of the insurgent. An insurgency gains momentum and legitimacy with the population over time. Early decisive government action can stop an insurgency before it matures and the cost of government victory increases. Government forces must temper their response with cultural and religion realities. Many times the government responds with inappropriate control measures, kinetic targeting and operations blind to culture and religion, which adds to the preexisting conditions that

fostered the original insurgency. Every insurgency offers a different problem set to military planners. Therefore, it is important to study past counterinsurgencies to build a foundation and apply critical thinking and reasoning skills to develop a counterinsurgency doctrine and strategy for current operations. The next two chapters discuss the British and French counterinsurgency campaigns.

Chapter 2 discusses the British experience in the Boer War of 1899-1902. The Boer War proves useful as a historical example for developing a counterinsurgency campaign plan for contemporary military thinkers. The purpose of this chapter is to use the British experience in South Africa to conduct an analysis of the doctrine, policies, and programs used by the British to fight the Boer commandos. There are many parallels between the British experiences and the US military's current operations in the Middle East. The chapter explores how the Boer War started, describes the early military engagements, and discusses how British doctrine changed to defeat the Boers. The Boer War demonstrates how a world power misjudged the enemy's purpose and intent, but, adapted and modified its doctrine to achieve peace on politically acceptable terms. The next chapter examines a counterinsurgency campaign conducted fifty years ago.

Chapter 3 looks at the French experience during the Algerian War for Independence from 1954 to 1962. The Algerian War demonstrates the difficult task of fighting against an ambiguous enemy who used terrorism as its primary tactic. The French fought a culture vastly different from their society. The French military entered the conflict with doctrine designed to defend against a Soviet attack in Europe. As the counterinsurgency grew in Algeria, the military adapted its doctrine and won the battles, but they ultimately lost the war. France changed its military doctrine to put down the

insurgency but the Algerian political, cultural, and religion forces defeated the military. The next chapter compares the British and French counterinsurgency operations.

Chapter 4 focuses on three issues found in counterinsurgency conflicts in both case studies: population control measures, operational tactics, and civil military operations. There are several reasons for choosing the three topics. Each specific topic resides in most counterinsurgency campaigns throughout the world. Military forces relocate civilians to enable freedom of maneuver during counterinsurgency operations. The military gains legitimacy with successful resettlement operations while mishandled operations cause resentment towards the government. Counterinsurgency operations require flexible tactics and adaptable doctrine. The British and the French conducted population control operations, changed their doctrines, and used civil military action to defeat the insurgents. Each government found different ways to solve similar problems. The COIN model in Figure 1 provides a common framework for analysis. Chapter 4 discusses how and why the British and French changed their doctrine. The final chapter explores how the British and French lessons learned apply today.

Chapter 5 offers recommendations to the US military based on the British and French counterinsurgency wars. Counterinsurgency conflicts offer an array of complex problems due to environmental considerations, technological advancements, social change, and political realities. History provides US military planners with the background to build an integrated counterinsurgency strategy for today's environment. In his book, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine*, Andrew Birtle described the factors of success as coordination between political, diplomatic, and military measures and the interactions between soldiers and the native populations.[5] In

other words, successful counterinsurgency operations occur when strategic vision incorporates the elements of national power and competent civilian and military personnel execute the strategy. The British in South Africa and the French in Algeria approached their problem with varying degrees of coordination between the civilian officials and military officers. The British and French cases offer two examples of civilian military cooperation and the relationship between the combatants and the civilian populations.

The Literature Review

Several books form the basis of research and analysis of each case study. Two important works are David Galula's, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* and Roger Trinquier's, *Modern Warfare A French View of Counterinsurgency.* Although both works are by Frenchmen written around the time of the conflict in Algeria, they provide insights that apply to all counterinsurgency wars. Both works cross borders and reach out to a much larger audience then just the French in Algeria.

Bard O'Neill's *Insurgency and Terrorism* and Robert Taber's *War of the Flea* are classic studies on insurgency. O'Neill provides a framework of insurgency researched from theoretical and historical writings. His insurgency framework provides a standard for discussion and analysis. Taber gives a classic study of a communist guerilla insurgency. He is critical of government forces and romanticizes the guerillas, but his work identifies and describes key topics such as popular support, political objectives, and terrorism. Each works gives common characteristics, phases, and patterns to insurgent operations and government responses. Their works emphasize the importance of the

political environment. As the British and French case studies prove, political victory is equally, if not more vital, than military victory.

Colonel C. E. Callwell's book, *Small War: Their Principles and Practice,* provides a common operational baseline from which to draw conclusions. Colonel Callwell wrote his book around the turn of the century. He was involved in nearly every British imperial conflict of his time. He fought in the Afghan War of 1890, the First Boer War, the Turko-Greek conflict, and the Second Boer War in 1899-1902. His book is relevant today because he provides clear advice to a commander during a low intensity conflict.

The US Marine Corps' *Manual of Small Wars* and Mao's *On Guerilla Warfare* provide two exceptional references on the conduct of a small war from different perspectives. Each work provides a foundation of knowledge and experience. The USMC's *Manual* gives classic military definitions, while recognizing the ambiguities of small wars. The Marine Corps developed the manual in response to the Banana War period of 1900 to 1930s. The Marine Corps learned a successful small war campaign must coordinate and synchronize the elements of national power. The *Manual* provides the counterinsurgency planner with a foundation. *On Guerilla Warfare* gives the insurgent's view of warfare.

Mao's work, *On Guerilla Warfare,* documents his views of warfare. Students of counterinsurgency war should read *On Guerilla Warfare*. Mao and his followers waged a twenty-year struggle against the Japanese and Nationalist Chinese Armies. Mao described the nature, tactics, history, and logistics of guerilla warfare. By understanding the guerilla fighter, it is more likely the government forces will develop a successful

strategy. *The Manual of Small Wars* and *On Guerilla Warfare* approach war from different perspectives, but they offer characteristics, patterns, strategies, tactics, and rules for conducting both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency side of the conflict. The aforementioned works provide the principles and standards for analyzing counterinsurgency operations. Books, journal articles, and monographs provide the specific details to analyze the success or failure of the British and French counterinsurgent campaigns.

A large body of literature exists for both the Boer War in South Africa and the war in Algeria. Journal and newspaper articles of the day document both topics in depth. Works of history and monographs provide insight into each conflict. Capstone books for the Boer War are Thomas Pakenham's *The Boer War* and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's *The Great Boer War*. Doyle finished his book at the end of the Boer War in 1902, while Pakenham's book was published in 1979 after extensive research and several remarkable discoveries of original documents from the era. Both works provide the detailed history of the conflict.

Informative books on the French Algerian War are Alistair Horne's *A Savage War of Peace* and John Talbott's *The War Without a Name.* Horne was in France in 1960 conducting other research when the conflict in Algeria spilled over into France itself. Paris braced for an assault launched from Algeria by the elite paratroopers. General de Galle's new government wavered and nearly fell and only de Gaulle personal appeal and strength saved his government. Talbott's book provides a readable narrative to a conflict that divided France, destroyed the Algerian economy and killed thousands of French soldiers, Algerian insurgents and civilians.

The two case studies offer similarities to the present day insurgent conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Boer War exemplifies how a world power forced an independent republic to comply with its national interests. The Boer War advanced Britain's political and economic agenda. The French conflict in Algeria offers many similarities to the conflict today in the Middle East. The population, demographics, religion, and geography of Algeria are similar to Iraq. Many consider the French military action in Algeria as the model to pattern other counterinsurgency strategies. However, the French lost in spite of its military success. The intent of this thesis is to analyze the British and French campaigns in order to help the US military plan, execute, and win current and future counterinsurgency wars.

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[1]Colonel C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, 3d ed. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska, 1996), 23.

[2]Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

[3]Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerilla Warfare* (Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 89.

[4]Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism-Inside the Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's Inc., 1990), 125.

[5]Andrew Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998), 4.

CHAPTER 2

A CASE STUDY OF THE BOER WAR, 1899-1902

> Let us admit it fairly, as a business people should, We have had no end of lesson; it will do us no end of good.[1]
>
> Rudyard Kipling, "The Lesson"

Rudyard Kipling wrote "The Lesson" during the Boer War. Kipling's verse urged Britain's politicians and soldiers to remember the high cost of fighting a war against a determined enemy. The stubborn Boer fighters refused to surrender the right to self-rule and their independence to the British Empire. Historical case studies present a valuable resource to military planners. However, fatal dangers exist if planners apply the wrong historical lessons. Case studies provoke discussion, aid staff training, and provide lessons learned. Military planners cannot afford to ignore the past when planning operations in today's complex environment. History does not provide a checklist to follow. It offers insights, patterns and cycles of behavior that give a start point to begin planning. Historical case studies provide knowledge to ask the right questions.

The British experience in the Boer War of 1899-1902 proves useful as a historical example for developing a counterinsurgency campaign plan for contemporary military thinkers. The purpose of this chapter is to use the British experience in South Africa to conduct an analysis of the doctrine, policies, and programs. The analysis will not create a specific format for success, but rather, provide generalizations and patterns about how the British military planners adapted their doctrine.

It is important to note the limitation of this chapter. There is not sufficient space here to discuss the treatment of the native Africans. They suffered greatly from

mistreatment distributed by both sides before, during, after the war. The African population remained oppressed and disenfranchised with limited civil rights and freedoms until the end of apartheid in 1994.

An issue important to the conflict was religion. White Europeans settled the coast of South Africa to escape religious persecution in the late 1600s and early 1700s. The settlers were a mixture of predominantly Dutch Calvinists, French Huguenots, and German Protestants.[2] The Boers represented the poorest segment of the European settlers. The Boers migrated from the coastal region to the interior in search of better farmland and to escape persecution. The Boers and British shared a common Christian background, which helped the transition to peace at the end of the war. During the conflict, the British did not consider the importance of religious freedom to the Boers. The British failed to take advantage of their common Christian background and values. They focused on targeting and destroying the Boer field army and support structure. The idea of using culture and religion in order to advance the government's interests reoccurs throughout the remaining sections, although the remainder of this chapter addresses conventional versus guerilla warfare, counterinsurgency policies, and changing operational doctrine.

The first section outlines the Boer War to provide information for an analysis. The middle section seeks to determine how and why the British changed their doctrine and tactics against the Boer armies within the framework of the COIN Model in Figure 1. The conclusion offers some of the British lessons learned from their experience in South Africa, such as, the value of reconnaissance, effective population control techniques, civil actions, and adaptive operational doctrine.

Boer War Background

The British intervened in South Africa when the Boer Republics declared war on the British Empire. At the declaration of war, the Boer armies invaded the British territories of Cape Colony and Natal with the intent of keeping British troops out of the Boer Republics. Prior to military action, both governments attempted to avert a crisis through negotiations during the summer in 1899. Joseph Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary and Sir Alfred Milner, the British Colonial High Commissioner represented the British political officials responsible for South African affairs. Chamberlain represented British power in London, while Milner was the British representative in South Africa.

It is important to provide the perspective of the two main British diplomats involved during the negotiations leading up to the war. Chamberlain and Milner agreed on the importance of maintaining and expanding the British Empire.[3] Specifically, Chamberlain and Milner wanted to expand British influence in South Africa in three areas: port facilities, mining interests, and voting and citizenship rights of recent settlers in South Africa.

On the first point, they wanted Britain to exercise more influence in South Africa to support trade between the Far East and Europe.[4] For example, the port of Cape Town represented an important stop for merchants traveling by sea from the Far East to European ports.[5] Chamberlain and Milner wanted to ensure British control of these important ports. Open sea-lanes and port capacity between Europe and India represented vital interests to the British government.

Personal friendships and business interests connected Milner to the mining industry. In the 1870s, Milner developed a relationship with George Parkin at Oxford. Later, Parkin became the secretary for the gold trust in Transvaal.[6] As the British Colonial High Commissioner, Milner held talks with influential British capitalist with interests in the Transvaal mines in 1997, one year prior to the start of the war.[7] The discovery of gold in the 1890s brought a large group of Europeans mine workers to the Transvaal region.

The majority of the new mine workers came from England. The Boers referred to this group of immigrants as Uitlanders.[8] The Boer leadership perceived a political threat represented by the rapid influx of the Uitlanders population. They feared a loss of political power to the Uitlanders voting block. Therefore, the Boer politicians from both Republics restricted Uitlander voting rights, their representation in government, and levied special taxes on the Uitlander population.[9] The discrimination against the Uitlanders population caused concerns among the British government, civil rights organizations, and the press. Accordingly, the London Times urged the British government to intervene on the Uitlanders' behalf.[10] The pressures of voting rights, the mining lobby, and the importance of Cape Town led Chamberlain and Milner to believe war was the only alternative in the summer of 1899.

During the first half of 1899, the leaders for both sides made speeches outlining their respective positions. Each side made peace overtures, while preparing for war. President Paul Kruger of Transvaal made three speeches in March and April in Europe and South Africa addressing Uitlander's franchise issues in an attempt to influence world opinion.[11] The issues deeply divided each side and Chamberlain and Milner agreed a

compromise was unlikely.[12] However, in order to sway British public opinion against the Boers and to paint them as the aggressors, Milner arranged for a peace conference in the Orange Free State that he wanted to fail.

Both sides agreed to meet at Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State in May 1899. The conference began on 31 May 1899 and disintegrated on 5 June 1899. Milner anticipated the conference failure from the very beginning. He negotiated with a fatalistic point of view.[13] Milner wanted the Boers to give up their independence, but he misjudged their national resolve. The Boers feared for their way of life and decided to fight for their Republic's survival. Kruger offered a compromise on the Uitlander voting and citizenship rights only slightly different from the British bottom line. However, Milner rejected the offer because he wanted total British rule in South Africa, which upset the Boer negotiating team. The conference ended on 5 June 1899 and both sides anticipated war. The British and the Boers had already begun preparations for war.[14] The British military expected a quick victory based on prior colonial experience, that is, they defeated comparable opponents with limited casualties and investment in the Sudan, Egypt, and India. Each side predicted the wrong future.

The Boer War began as a conventional war and evolved into a guerilla action. The first phase of the war lasted from October 1899 to April 1900. The British used artillery preparation, infantry assault and cavalry charge. The British fought along the railroad to secure their lines of communication. The British generals arrayed their forces of infantry, artillery, and cavalry in a set piece battle formation according to their doctrine. The Boer fighters followed a different plan. They dug trenches for protection, smokeless powder concealed their position, and superior horsemanship enabled them to outmaneuver the

British. The Boers developed these techniques from fighting the native population in South Africa.

In 1838 during the fighting between the Boers and native Zulu tribes along the Marico River near Mafeking, the Boers honed their mobile warfare skills. The Boers rode out onto the plains to face the Zulu tribesman. Horses provided mobility and rifles increased standoff range and firepower. They dismounted their horses and fired volleys into the Zulu formations. The Boers galloped away before the Zulus could engage the Boers. The Boers repeated the techniques of dismounting, firing, and fleeing. Approximately, one hundred and thirty five Boers defeated about twelve thousand Zulu warriors.[15] In 1899, the Boers added the trench and smokeless powder to their method of engagement.

In the past, musket fire gave away the shooters position by the signature puff of smoke. The shooter remained concealed with the invention of smokeless powder. Smokeless powder enabled the Boers to volley fire their Mauser rifles and remain hidden from the British infantry and artillery. In Jean de Bloch's lecture to the British Army in 1901, he argued the invention of smokeless powder was a main factor in the British reconnaissance failures.[16] The lack of reconnaissance contributed to heavy casualties suffered by the British in the early part of the war. The Boer commandos dug trenches and remained undetected until the British formations maneuvered into effective fire range. The Boers, then, fired multiple volleys with their Mauser repeating rifles. Consequently, early British frontal attacks endured heavy casualties. Eventually, the British massed enough combat power to dislodge the Boers from their trenches. The Boers created a defense in depth. As the Boers positions became untenable, they mounted

their horses and fled to the next defendable position which gave them flexibility and a defense in depth strategy. The British leadership slowly grasped the nature of the conflict after a series of defeats given by the Boers.

Conventional War and British Doctrine

The Boers inflicted three consecutive defeats on British forces at Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso in December 1899. The British media labeled the defeats "Black Week."[17] At the Battle of Stormberg, Lieutenant-General Gatacre led his brigade to recapture a strategic railroad junction. General Buller instructed Gatacre not to take any unnecessary risks. However, when Gatacre learned of a Boer concentration ten miles to his north near the railroad junction, he ordered a forced night march to attack the Boers and secure the junction. In *The Great Boer War,* Arthur Conan Doyle provided a good description of General Gatacre leadership style. Doyle said, "General Gatacre, a man who bore a high reputation for fearlessness and tireless energy, though he had been criticized, notably during the Soudan campaign, for have called upon his men for undue and unnecessary exertion."[18] Despite Gatacre's enthusiasm, the brigade got lost due to inadequate reconnaissance, the mistake of a guide, and the desire to engage the enemy. At dawn the next day, the Boers mauled the unprepared British unit and inflicted almost 700 casualties.[19] Gatacre's poor judgment and lack of reconnaissance caused heavy casualties and failed to secure the junction. A subsequent engagement near a ridgeline at Magersfontein mirrored the catastrophe at Stormberg.

The failure to conduct a thorough reconnaissance contributed to heavy casualties and mission failure at Magersfontein. General Methuen sent scouts north from his position to find the Boers' disposition. The scouts received Mauser fire about a mile from

the Boers' trench works and retired but failed to notice the fortifications. On the ridgeline, the Boers dug a twelve-mile-long line of earthworks and fortifications. The main trench line was eight hundred yards long and five feet deep.[20]

Methuen repeated Gatacre's intelligence failures by attacking the Boers without knowing their strength or disposition. At dawn, the British started with artillery fire as the infantry maneuvered into position. Ineffective artillery fire failed to soften the Boers' prepared positions. As the British marched into rifle range, the Boers fired their Mausers with great effect. The lead company took severe casualties and the fire pinned the entire battalion down. For the next nine hours, the Boers and the British slugged it out with rifle and artillery fire. At nightfall, the British retrieved their dead and wounded and retired from the field. The Boers stalemated the mighty British troops at Magersfontein Ridge. Lack of reconnaissance prior to the battle contributed to the failure of the attack. The commanders failed to gather sufficient enemy information from which to plan an attack. The commander of the last "Black Week" battle failed to conduct a serious reconnaissance, which led to unnecessary casualties.

At Colenso, General Buller suffered the third defeat of "Black Week." Buller needed to control the city of Colenso to protect his lines of communication as he attacked north. Reconnaissance elements found the Boers dug in on both sides of the railroad along the Tugela River, but failed to determine enemy disposition and strength. Buller attacked in the same manner as Meuthen at Magersfontein. As British artillery fired to support the advance, the infantry maneuvered unknowingly into an enemy fire cul-de-sac.

The lead infantry unit made a wrong turn and tried to ford the river directly in front of the entrenched Boer riflemen. The Boer's rifle fire decimated the floundering

infantry. The attack failed and Buller retreated. The British suffered one hundred forty three killed, seven hundred fifty-five wounded and two hundred and forty missing in action or about a five percent casualty rate.[21] Buller consolidated and reorganized behind the Tulega River. The casualty figures since October 1899 including "Black Week" totaled nearly seven hundred killed and three thousand wounded.[22] The casualty lists shocked the British public and military alike. As described by Pakenham, "The people of Britain had had war on the cheap for half a century. Small wars against savages: the big-game rifle against the spear and the rawhide shield. Small casualties-for the British."[23] Britain expected their Imperial Army to maintain the empire at low cost in British lives and money.

The cumulative results of "Black Week" forced the British to rethink their set piece tactics. They realized the deficiency in reconnaissance. In future combat, British commanders employed the cavalry to scout enemy positions as opposed to finishing the attack. On the public side, the military's defeat unified the British citizenry at home. The public expected military victories. The politicians used the public's sympathy to garner support and recruit more troops to ship out to South Africa. The British "small war" army had won colonial wars on the cheap with light casualties. Now, a determined Boer enemy required the British to recruit, fund, and deploy the largest expeditionary Army in British history.[24] By early 1900, the British deployed enough combat power to regain the initiative. The British leadership understood a need to change doctrine and tactics to avoid heavy casualties.

As the war developed, two distinct theaters with different commanders emerged. Field Marshall Lord Lansdowne Roberts commanded the overall theater and exercised

personal control of the troops on the Western Front. General Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchner served as Roberts' Chief of Staff and eventually replaced him as the overall commander in November of 1900. In the West, Lord Roberts commanded five divisions totaling forty thousand troops with five thousand cavalry and over one hundred field guns, adding support personnel, the total number of troops climbed to over 180,000.[25] Lord Roberts' general scheme of maneuver called for a movement to contact from Cape Town into the Boer Republics along the railroad in a north by northeast direction.

On the Eastern Front, General Buller was subordinate to Lord Roberts, but Buller prosecuted the war in his own way. General Buller attacked generally from the port of Durban along the railroad towards Ladysmith and into the Free Orange State. Each commander applied the set piece battle doctrine to the terrain, enemy situation, and troop strength. Roberts and Kitchener, operating on broad plains with large numbers of troops, advanced along a wide front constantly threatening the Boers' flanks causing the Boers to fall back steadily to avoid encirclement.

In the East, Buller developed a much more sophisticated model compared to Roberts.[26] Buller developed the combined arms approach. He used creeping artillery fire to protect the advancing infantry as it moved in small groups from one covered position to another. New tactics emerged for the infantry to operate in small fire teams and use cover and concealment during the assault. The artillery covered the infantry's movement and interdicted the fleeing enemy. The idea of sustained combat began with Buller on the East Front in South Africa.[27]

The time in contact with the enemy increased from hours to days under Buller's system. Battles covered more terrain and a commander no longer viewed the entire

battlefield. The terrain molded Buller's tactics. He could not conduct wide sweeping movements to encircle the enemy. Buller faced narrow avenues of approach with hills and ravines cutting the terrain. The combined arms approach succeeded at the Battles of Cingolo and Monte Cristo.[28] Buller outmaneuvered the Boers by coordinating the artillery preparation with the infantry assault. The artillery fire stayed just ahead of the infantry. The infantry moved in smaller units and tried to assail a flank while using fire and maneuver techniques. The new doctrine and tactics proved successful and Buller gained his objectives.[29] The British generals learned from mistakes and adapted doctrine and tactics to take advantage of the terrain, the enemy dispositions, and the friendly troop strength. In response to the British success, the Boer leadership searched for a new tactic to bring peace to their Republics.

Guerilla Warfare

British massed overwhelming combat power, adapted their tactics and forced the Boers on the defensive. In March of 1900, the Boer leadership held a conference to discuss the future of the war. The Boer Republic Presidents Paul Kruger and Marthinus Steyn, along with Boer generals, Christiaan De Wet, Piet Joubert, Koos De La Rey attended the conference. De Wet argued for a change in strategy to guerilla warfare.[30] He described three steps necessary to launch a guerilla warfare campaign: one, weed out unreliable men, two, increase mobility by giving up the large wagon trains that supported the Boers, and three, abandon the defensive strategy and adopt a mobile raiding strategy in which mobile Boer columns operated behind the lines.[31] Faced with growing British power, the leaders employed hit and run tactics to bleed the British military machine. They abandoned the conventional approach and embraced guerilla warfare. The Boer

leadership understood that their strength lay in mobility and knowledge of the terrain. The Boers looked for lightly guarded, unprepared, and high value targets.

By mid May 1900, British armies in the east and west gained momentum against the Boer defenses and moved north towards Pretoria. On 5 June, Pretoria, the Transvaal capital fell. However, its capture did not end the fighting. Boer armies and men were capable of sustaining operations in the field. The Boer commandos continued to raid supply lines and isolated garrisons. As Sir Arthur Conan Doyle described in his book *The Great Boer War*, "From Lichtenburg to Komati, a distance of four hundred miles, there was sporadic warfare everywhere, attacks upon scattered posts, usually beaten off but occasionally successful, attacks upon convoys, attacks upon railway trains, attack upon anything and everything which could harass the invaders."[32] Local guerilla attacks could not achieve a strategic military victory but the Boers' goal was to inflict enough damage to the military so that the political leaders decided to opt for a negotiated settlement. Therefore, the guerillas continued to attack vulnerable soft targets along the British lines of communications.

As the conflict transitioned from a conventional war to a guerilla war, the COIN model serves as an analytical tool. The COIN model in Figure 1 provides a framework of reference to measure the effectiveness of programs and policies of the British towards the population and insurgents. As discussed earlier, the model depicts the relationship between the government, insurgents, and the population. The British represented the government or counterinsurgency forces. The bubbles at the apexes of the triangle represent the relative strength of each component. For example, when the government forces launch a successful operation against a guerilla base, the insurgent bubble shrinks

and the government bubble grows. There is not a mathematical formula to determine the size of the bubbles, but rather observations from the past help the counterinsurgency planners to visualize or forecast the success of a policy or military operation. In the model, the insurgent circle represents the Boer commandos, the population circle represents the Boer farmers and families, and the government circle is the British government.

The Boer forces received support, intelligence, and safe haven from the population. This caused the British to devise different tactics to counter the Boer guerilla base of support. The British recognized the link between the farms and the Boer fighters. In his book, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, Bard O'Neill described the need to drive a wedge between an insurgent force and the population.[33] There are many ways to separate the insurgent and the population. During the Boer War, the British used harsh methods to control the population and deny support to the fighters. The British columns burned farms to deny support and established concentration camps to control the population. Both methods of control created turmoil and outrage in England among the population and politicians. The British wanted a mechanism to protect the sympathetic Boers from reprisals. The concentration camp policy turned into a disaster but not by intent.[34] The British established the camps to protect Boer sympathizers, but the scorched earth policy drove the farmers off the land and into camps that were ill equipped to handle the large numbers of refugees.

The establishment of population control camps began in the summer of 1900. As the war progressed and became more irregular, the camps grew in size and nature to include prisoner of war and families of war supporters and families displaced by the

practice of farm burning. In 1901, the camps reached a peak of more than 160,000 civilians detained.[35] The British placed the camps along the railroad for convenience of supply. However, lack of clean water and poor sanitation practices caused disease to ravage the camps. In October 1901, more than 3,156 civilians died of measles, typhoid, jaundice, malaria, bronchitis, and pneumonia.[36] Over a two years period, the conditions killed between 20,000 and 28,000 Boers, mostly women and children.[37] At about the same time, mounted columns began the practice of farm burning.

In July 1900, General Archibald Hunter and 2,000 mounted troops moved east across the new Orange River Colony in search of a suspected Boer force in the mountains. Hunter received instructions to conduct more "stringent measures" in dealing with the Boers.[38] Hunter began burning Boer farms along his route of march. Despite the destruction of their livelihood, the Boer farmer still believed in independence and the Boer way of life. The practice fueled hatred for the British. The burning destroyed a main source of supply for the Boers. The British burned over 600 farms between June and November of 1900 in the Orange River Colony and Transvaal.[39]

A serious and divisive debate took place in the British parliament over the practice of civilian internment and farm burning. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, leader of the liberal opposition brought the issue to the parliament. Emily Hobhouse, Secretary of the South Africa Concilliation Committee worked tirelessly to improve the conditions in the camps in parliament and the press.[40] Hobhouse traveled throughout South Africa and gave first hand accounts of the terrible conditions in the camps. Despite the accounts given by Hobhouse, politicians in parliament supported the conduct of the military in South Africa.

Supporters of the property destruction and incarceration argued total war required difficult choices when faced with a determined opponent willing to sacrifice everything. Supporters argued interment camps and destruction of farms would shorten the war. Opponents pointed to the Hague Convention of 1899. The Articles within the Conventions codified war, combatants, belligerents, treatment of prisoners of war, and property destruction. Opponents of the war pointed out the Conventions as a standard for war and the Articles prohibited destruction of undefended property and incarceration of non-combatants. Lord Kitchener, military commander in South Africa, acknowledged the deplorable conditions and worked to clean the camps. Camp sanitation, food, and water steadily improved and the civilian death rate dropped by the end of the war.[41] As the debate continued in England, the British military searched for other methods to defeat and restrict the mobility of the Boer commando.

The British needed a method to trap the Boer horsemen and impede their mobility. Part of the idea to attack the Boers mobility advantage came from the failure to capture Christiaan de Wet. De Wet symbolized the successful Boer guerilla who captured the imagination of fellow Boers and the British public. De Wet escaped a trap set by Lord Kitchener and his staff. De Wet's escape increased his mystique and embarrassed Kitchener. In response, Kitchener devised a plan to hem in the guerillas by using barbwire and blockhouse.[42] The British planned to divide South Africa into sections by stringing wire from blockhouse to blockhouse. The blockhouse system protected the railroad, impeded commando movement, and provided intelligence. The blockhouse system survived because the Boers lacked field guns and could not reduce a blockhouse by using stand off weapons. The British constructed over 8,000 blockhouses and ran

3,700 miles of barbwire by the end of the war.[43] The blockhouses alone did not end the war, but the system did put pressure on the Boer military operations and restricted their movement.[44] An operation planned by Kitchener exemplifies the blockhouse and wire technique.

In February 1902, Kitchener received intelligence reports that placed De Wet in an area surrounded by a completed blockhouse rectangle. Kitchener organized four mobile columns to capture De Wet and about seven hundred guerillas. Pakenham describes the depth of the four columns, "On the night of 5 February, these four super columns, about nine thousand strong, roughly one man for every ten yards, lined out across the fifty-four miles of the open end of the rectangle."[45] Kitchener's effort failed to capture De Wet and his group of guerillas. De Wet broke out of the trap by simply cutting the wire in an unguarded section. De Wet escaped capture again, but the British netted large number of valuable horses, cattle, and wagons. The blockhouse and sweep system was not perfect but it did put pressure on the Boer guerillas.

In June 1901, the Boer leadership decided to launch one more large-scale operation to force the British to the negotiation table. They conducted a two-prong raid into Natal Colony and Cape Colony. The Boer leadership intended to prepare the way for a larger invasion of Cape Colony. Each raiding party cut through the blockhouse defenses, but achieved only local success. This last ditch effort did not force the British to negotiation or tip the balance in the political war. However, as the guerillas moved through the countryside, they saw the destruction caused by the British burning policy and the lack of civilians in the countryside. They observed burnt farms and dead livestock throughout the Free Orange State. The raiders could not feed their horses or themselves.

Weather, poor grass, and a limited supplies forced the raiders back into their shrinking safety zone. The policies of Kitchener and the work of over 250,000 British troops forced the Boer leadership to seek peace.

In May 1902, delegations from both sides sat down and negotiated a peace settlement. In the end, the Boers received amnesty for all war acts and the right to self-government, that is, they retained a semiautonomous rule supervised by the British Colonial office. The British compensated the Boers for lying down their arms. The COIN model tipped in favor of the British government because the British military broke the will of the people to support the Boer army. The Boer army was not defeated but it could not achieve a military victory and the British suppressed the Boer civilian population to a point where it could not influence the political or military struggle. Therefore, the scales tipped in favor of the British counterinsurgent forces. The British military inflicted so much hardship on the civilian populace that it forced the Boer leadership to capitulate. The war cost both sides dearly in terms of money and lives.

Conclusion

The British succeeded in South Africa because they adapted old doctrine to the current battlefield conditions. First, the military modified the three-piece battle doctrine and developed a combined arms approach. They conducted reconnaissance with cavalry and coordinated the artillery fire to cover the movement of the infantry to the last possible moment. As the war transitioned to a guerilla fight, the British developed techniques to erode the Boers' base of support and restrict their mobility. The British destroyed the Boer commando's base of support by burning farms and interning civilians. The British military succeeded on the battlefield and the civilian leadership was able to

maintain support at home in spite of serious debate on controversial issues. The politicians addressed the concentration camp issue and marginalized the dissenting Liberal party who advocated a withdrawal from South Africa. The British military under political supervision cleaned up the concentration camp issue, which silenced many objectors.

In terms of the COIN model, the British policies and developing doctrine focused on destroying the Boer guerilla army. They did not spend time and energy trying to co-opt the civilian population. The British developed fairly harsh techniques to control the population and destroy the support base of the Boer guerilla fighters. The British promulgated an unwritten policy to burn farms and kill livestock that took support away from the guerilla force. The British policies and programs brought the Boers guerilla leadership to the negotiation table. The British were successful for several reasons. The Boers received limited external support, the British deployed large numbers of troops to control the countryside, and the British destroyed the Boers base of support, and the British never lost support for the war at home. There was dissent against the war, mainly regarding the concentration camp issue. However, the British government and military responded and cleaned up the concentration camps to placate the public.

The British experience in the Boer War offers several concrete examples of operational success and failure, but they are in the context of that time and place. Counterinsurgency planners can study the British military in the Boer War and form a baseline of action to develop a strategy to defeat an insurgent force. History provides planners with background information to craft the right questions when developing courses of action. US military planner must continue to improve reconnaissance methods

and intelligence gathering at the human level, find new ways to control the population, and constantly seek to develop new doctrine and tactics to battle the enemy. Success occurs when current and new technological capabilities blend with human flexibility and adaptation to the current environment while using the past as a guide.

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[1]Rudyard Kipling, "The Lesson." *Rudyard Kipling Complete Verse* (New York: First Anchor Books, 1989), 297.

[2]Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War* (New York: Random House, 1979), xiii.

[3]Iain R. Smith, *The Origins of the South African War 1890-1902* (Longman Group Limited: Essex, England, 1996), 145.

[4]Ibid., 145-148.

[5]Ibid., 405,

[6]Ibid., 146.

[7]Ibid., 213.

[8]The Boer word, Utilander, describes newly arrived European immigrants.

[9]Smith, 49.

[10]Ibid., 98.

[11]Ibid., 254.

[12]Ibid., 278.

[13]Ibid., 288.

[14]Ibid., 288-293.

[15]Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *The Great Boer War* (New York: McClure Phillips and Company, 1902), 6.

[16]Jean de Bloch, *Jean de Bloch: Selected Articles* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 46.

[17]Pakenham, 257.

[18]Doyle, 96.

[19]Pakenham, 223.

[20]Ibid., 207.

[21]Ibid., 250.

[22]Ibid., 258.

[23]Ibid., 258.

[24]Ibid., 258.

[25]Jay Stone, *The Boer War and Its Effects on British Military Reform* (City University of New York, University Microfilms International, 1985), 174.

[26]Ibid., 175.

[27]Pakenham, 363.

[28]Ibid., 364.

[29]Ibid., 380.

[30]Ibid., 408.

[31]Ibid., 408.

[32]Doyle, 310.

[33]Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism-Inside the Modern Revolutionary Warfare (*Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's Inc, 1990), 136.

[34]Denis Judd and Keith Surridge, *The Boer War* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 194.

[35]Ibid., 194.

[36]Ibid., 194.

[37]Pakenham, xxi-xxii.

[38]Ibid., 466.

[39]Judd and Surridge, 191.

[40]Ibid., 194.

[41]Ibid., 194.

[42]Ibid., 189.

[43]Stone, 381.

[44]Judd and Surridge, 190.

[45]Pakenham, 578.

CHAPTER 3

A CASE STUDY OF THE FRENCH ALGERIAN CONFLICT: 1954-1962

> As thou canst [sic] observe, under colonialism Justice, Democracy and Equality are only a snare and a delusion designed to deceive thee and plunge thee day by day into the poverty thou knowest only too well. [1]
>
> A note found on the body of a terrorist killed on All Saints Day

The note above confirms the deep commitment of the Algerian insurgents to their goals and objectives. The French military waged an effective campaign against the Algerians fighters. They killed the insurgent leadership, separated the terrorist from the support base, cut off external support, and initiated social reforms. However, after eight years of conflict, the French signed a peace treaty granting the Algerians independence and self-rule.

The French experience during the Algerian War for Independence provides context and historical examples for developing a contemporary counterinsurgency plan. The purpose of this chapter is to use the French military actions in Algeria to conduct an analysis of counterinsurgency doctrine, policies, and programs. The analysis will not create a checklist to follow when developing a counterinsurgency plan. However, the analysis will generate concrete examples and discernable patterns that enable a military planner to develop an integrated counterinsurgency strategy.

There are limitations to this case study. The European colonial population in Algeria wielded great influence in the French parliament and they represented an important segment of the population but the roles of the European colonialists are not

central to the thesis. The Battle of Algiers was an important part of the French war in Algeria.[2] The Battle of Algiers is not covered because the subject is well documented in film and text. The last aspect of the war not covered in this thesis is psychological operations. Both the French and the Algerian insurgents practiced psychological warfare. It is an important topic and deserves a thorough analysis. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. This chapter's goal is to analyze France's military policies, programs, and doctrine in the context of application to the current military environment within the counterinsurgency framework.

It is important to discuss religion and culture when analyzing the French Algerian War. Islamic traditions and principles guided the Algerian population while the colonialist and the French are Christians and predominantly Catholic. The French failed to craft policy and programs that accounted for the Algerians' Islamic beliefs. They tried to impose French culture, language, and Christianity during civil military operations. Religion and culture played an important part of the conflict. In COIN operations, cultural understanding and awareness legitimizes government actions aimed at influencing the population.

The COIN model in Figure 1 provides a framework of reference to measure the effectiveness of programs and policies of the French military. As discussed earlier, the model depicts the relationship between the government, insurgents, and the population. The bubbles at the apexes of the triangle represent the relative strength of each component. For example, when the government forces launch a successful operation against a guerilla base, the insurgent bubble shrinks and the government sphere of influence expands. Critical thinking and analysis applied to historical case studies help

visualize, coordinate, and direct policy implementation. In the model, the insurgent circle represents the Algerian guerillas, the population circle represents the Muslim population, and the government circle represents both the French government and the French colonialists' sphere of influence.

The first section of the chapter outlines the beginning of the war in Algeria from 1954 to late 1958 and early 1959. The French initially did not recognize the potency of the Algerian independence movement. The repressive policies, feelings of humiliation, and lack of confidence in the colonial government fueled the independence movement in Algeria. The Muslim population lashed out against the ruling elite. There was not a declaration of war, such as one described in the Boer War study. Therefore, the French government responded with limited resources. However by early 1959, the French military gained the upper hand and the insurgency could not mount the decisive operations envisioned in a classic communist Maoist insurgency.[3] The conclusion offers some of the lessons learned by the French from their experience in North Africa, such as, population control techniques, civil military operations, and adaptive operational doctrine. The COIN model provides a simple method to analyze the French military's effort. A brief historical narrative provides context for the study.

The Beginnings of Conflict

The French government and people considered Algeria to be a French province, not merely a colonial possession. In December 1848, the Second Republic formally annexed Algeria and declared it an important part of France.[4] When Jacques Soustelle took over as France's Governor General of Algeria in early 1955, he spoke to the Algiers Assembly and assured the European settlers and Algerian Muslims that strong bonds held

France and Algeria together. He said, "Algeria and all her inhabitants form an integral part of France, one and indivisible."[5] From a French perspective, it was important to maintain French integrity and culture in North Africa. The government, military, and public believed Algeria represented an important part of French prestige. In fact, the French deployed the largest non-volunteer military force to Algeria. The typical young draftee who served in Algeria was not a veteran of the Indochina campaigns.[6] However, many of the middle grade, and senior officers, and noncommissioned officers did see action extensive action in Vietnam.

The French military began the conflict with doctrine and equipment developed to fight with NATO on the plains of Europe. The first forces deployed to Algeria consisted of heavy forces with tanks and armored vehicles that proved unsuitable to the terrain and enemy. The French deployed elite paratroop units to battle the insurgents in the countryside. The French officers in Algeria arguably represented the most experienced wartime officer corps in history.[7] Many received their baptism of fire in World War Two. Almost every colonel and above took part in the French struggle in Indochina. For perspective, the fighting in Algeria started two months after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu.[8] The French army deployed to Algeria possessed the skills and equipment for a conventional war on the plains of Europe against the Warsaw Block. In Algeria, they faced a determined, resilient, foreign enemy who fought with a different set of rules.

The main opposition group was called the Front de Liberation Nationale or FLN.[9] The FLN's goals and objectives stemmed from the feelings of frustration and humiliation over real and perceived economic and social inequities forced on the Muslim population by the French mainland government and European colonialists in Algeria. For example,

Algerians fought with French troops during both World Wars, but never received formal recognition for their collective sacrifices and hardships.[10] The Algerians recognized social injustices especially in the cities but were powerless to change society. For example, the Algerians and colonists divided political power equally despite the fact that the Muslim population outnumbered the Europeans by three to one. This type of inequality existed in other programs.

In education, the majority of the schools educated Europeans. There were 1,400 schools for 200,000 European children and 699 for 1.25 million Muslim children.[11] Clearly, a situation of inequality existed, but the French and the settlers failed to predict the wave of violence and determination displayed by the insurgents. In his book, *The War Without a Name*, John Talbott described the inequalities and the failure to institute a new policy or program to correct the situation. He noted, "No institution served, at any point in the society, to join the two sides of the fault together."[12] This is important because the colonialists possessed a strong voice in the French government, while the Muslims had virtually no voice at all. European colonists wielded tremendous political power in the French parliament. During the course of the conflict, the colonialists effectively lobbied the mainland French government to commit troops and resources to suppress the Algerian revolt. The disparate political power forced the educated Algerians to look for outside support and assistance. Other Arab and Muslim nations provided the Algerian insurgents with logistic, moral, and monetary support.

External support from Egypt enabled the FLN to acquire arms and finances.[13] Tunisia and Morocco allowed the FLN to use its territory as a sanctuary and base for rest, training, planning and arms running. The FLN leadership traveled to foreign capitals to

petition sympathetic governments for arms and finances. Eastern European countries supported the FLN with arms.[14] In the context of the Cold War, communist and non-aligned nations supported the FLN politically. The Algerian battlefield enabled the Soviet block countries to extend their influence into North Africa. An Algerian delegation received an invitation to participate in a conference of the emerging Third World.[15] In December 1960, the UN General Assembly, led by the North African block, voted overwhelming for the rights of the Algerian people to seek self-determination and independence.[16] The FLN received the critical external support necessary to wage an insurgency.

The Algerian War for Independence

From a French perspective, the war started on 1 November 1954, All Saints Day. The FLN exploded dozens of bombs and ambushed government officials to signal a nation wide rebellion. The FLN coordinated over seventy attacks across the country that ranged from destroying telegraphs poles and torching tobacco warehouses to raiding several police stations. The authorities assessed the damage at nearly 200 million francs.[17] The attacks succeeded in terrorizing local officials and destroying infrastructure, but it failed to cause the general revolt envisioned by the FLN leadership.

On 1 November 1954, the FLN broadcasted its birth, agenda, and goals on Radio Cairo and scattered pamphlets throughout the country. The objectives and means of the struggle remained remarkably true to the original directives throughout the eight-year conflict.[18] They outlined their objectives as national independence, a return to the principles of Islam, the removal of corruption within society, international recognition, and North African unity. They proposed to use all means available and they

acknowledged the reality of a protracted struggle, but they were certain of the outcome. As an olive branch, the FLN offered the settlers citizenship and promised to respect French culture and economic interests. In 1954, the FLN did not possess the means to communicate directly with the French government. Therefore, the FLN message went unheeded by the French authorities.

The European settlers expressed outrage at the attacks and called for immediate action. The Algerian violence caught the French government by surprise. The French reaction combined with the settlers' suspicion, shock, and outrage began a cycle of increased acts of violence by both sides. The cycle created an atmosphere of recriminations, violence, and hatred. Alistair Horne notes how predictable and difficult the cycle was to break,

> First comes the mass indiscriminate roundups of the suspects, most of them innocent but converted into ardent militants by the fact of their imprisonment; then the setting of faces against liberal reforms designed to tackle the root of the trouble; followed, finally, when too late, by a new, progressive policy of liberalization.[19]

The French government in Paris passed a series of resolutions that stated order must be restored and the guilty parties held accountable for their actions. The French public did not understand the hatred and humiliation felt by the Algerian Muslim population. The government and military could not lose part of France, especially in the aftermath of Indochina. Specifically, the French officer corps felt cheated and abandoned by the French government in Vietnam. To the French military, another defeat in Algeria represented a loss of world prestige and influence. Both sides prepared to win the struggle regardless of the cost. The acts of beheadings, tortures, and mutilations were indicators of the level of commitment and passion on each side. The French recognized

the Algerian constabulary could not handle the persistent FLN attacks. Therefore, the French government deployed troops to Algeria.

In late 1954, the first paratroop unit arrived in Algeria. Colonel Ducournau of the 25th Airborne Division began operations in the Aures area, known for its insurgent sympathy and activity. Colonel Ducournau saw action in Indochina. He studied the Vietminh tactics during his time in Vietnam. He brought the Indochina school of insurgency to Algeria. He set up his headquarters and in the hills and lived with the civilian population. His unit relentlessly pursued the guerillas throughout the area. The 25th Airborne Division stayed in the field and conducted mobile operations into the spring of 1955. He used local guides and interpreters to enable his troops to engage the FLN. The military pressure nearly crushed the FLN insurgents.[20]

Colonel Ducournau's pursuit theories worked but the success proved difficult to measure and the strain on the FLN went unrecognized by intelligence service. Insurgent activity decreased allowing the French to rest and refit the troops. During the lull, the FLN redoubled its recruiting and training efforts to renew the fight. Both sides prepared for further attacks. The circle of violence in Algeria was only beginning and would last almost eight years.

In February 1955, the French government replaced the ineffective incumbent governor-general of Algeria with a more "imposing figure" that man was Jacques Soustelle.[21] Governor General Soustelle arrived in Algeria determined to stem the violence. He fought with the Free France Resistance during World War Two and was an experienced diplomat. He helped devise an anti-terrorist strategy based on integrating Algeria into France. He wanted to assimilate Algeria to ensure peace and stability.[22]

Soustelle's policies failed to account for the Algerian Muslim culture and were doomed to fail. A more realistic policy consists of political and social reforms aimed at integrating the Algerians into the decision-making and governmental processes with a fair representation. However, the colonists and others would have vehemently opposed such a policy. Soustelle faced a difficult situation based on fundamental cultural differences.

Soustelle recognized limited government capacity existed in rural Algeria. In response, Soustelle created the Section Administrative Specialists or SAS corps to integrate French influence in the rural areas.[23] The SAS interacted with Muslims at the lowest level. The teams provided key governmental functions such as administration, teaching, health care, housing, and hospitals. The team leader was usually a captain or lieutenant with three to four non-commissioned officers.

The effective SAS teams improved the quality of life in the provinces. SAS teams worked with the local community to determine their needs and resourced specific projects designed to improve the standard of living. The education of young Muslim people received priority. They coordinated and oversaw many building projects. Hospitals and schools provided a needed service to the rural Muslim population. Insurgent activity decreased and the level of government legitimacy increased when SAS teams were successful. Soustelle's SAS concept strengthened the government legitimacy and increased popular support or in terms of the COIN model the government and population bubbles expanded.

The SAS teams needed a wide range of expertise. As Galula discussed in his counterinsurgent theory, "The soldier must then be prepared to become a propagandist, a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout."[24] Soustelle

understood the importance of gaining and maintaining the support of the people. The government expanded its legitimacy by providing basic services and security to the population. However, manning problems caused teams to lack the required mix of skills.

SAS concept experienced problems. First, the FLN targeted and killed many of the successful SAS units. Second, trained personnel were at a premium and never met the requirements. As discussed above, successful SAS teams possessed the traits of a soldiers, builder, and teacher. The French military failed to train its soldier on the skills necessary for a successful SAS team. French commanders organized the teams from within their units. Finally, the SAS teams taught French subjects in the schools and viewed all projects from a French perspective. Many Muslims appreciated and thanked the SAS teams for building infrastructure. However, many more resented the SAS for advocating the French language and culture with little regard their Islamic heritage. The French army did not possess the critical cultural awareness skills required to truly integrate French culture into Islamic society. The SAS teams needed more coordination with Islamic leaders to develop a program to blend both societies into a united country.

Many SAS teams lacked leadership and cultural skills. In many circumstances, the SAS centers concentrated on intelligence collection. The Muslim population recognized the intelligence effort, which delegitimized the overall SAS effort to build institutional capacity and instill French culture. Soustelle primary objective was to keep Algeria French, pacify the Muslims, and maintain the status quo. Soustelle failed to understand the religious and cultural aspects inherent in the root cause of the Muslim anger and feelings of resentment that manifested itself in terrorism. The society was split between European and Muslim cultures with no mechanism in place to integrate the

people. Soustelle's programs of social, economic, and political reform did not appeal or placate the Muslim majority in 1955.

Therefore, the FLN's message resonated with the Muslim population that enabled recruiting efforts and force regeneration. The FLN launched a new offensive in the spring of 1955. The attacks dotted the French intelligence maps in what became known as the smallpox chart.[25] The FLN attacked police stations, sympathizers, government buildings, and farms. The FLN mutilated its victims to send a message of fear. The mutilations signaled an increase in the severity of attacks and rising levels of violence, hatred, and atrocities that permeated the conflict.

In February 1956, the Mollet government in conjunction with the French military leadership developed the quadrillage system that helped pacify the frontier. The system divided Algeria into military zones of control. John Talbott, in his book, *The War Without a Name*, gives a good description of the quadrillage system "the main task of the majority was to protect the persons and property of settlers and Algerians, to keep the main roads and railroads open and travelers safe from ambush."[26] The system in conjunction with the SAS teams promoted French influence beyond the urban centers. French troops garrisoned near strategic population centers assisted the local police with combating terrorism. In rural areas, they organized around villages and farms to create a local defensive network. They recruited local Muslim leaders to assist in resettlement operations, intelligence gathering, and police operations.

Once a local commander secured his sector, the troops were available to higher commanders for large-scale operations. The veteran airborne troops acted as a quick reaction force under the zone commander. The quadrillage system required large numbers

of troops and a sophisticated logistic system. Of the 400,000 French troops deployed to Algeria, less than ten percent actually fought, the remainder conducted stability and security duties such as, protecting farms and critical infrastructure. The system required about 300,000 troops.[27] Beginning in 1959, General Maurice Challe's large-scale military sweep operations coordinated with the quadrillage system successfully erased guerilla activity across Algeria.[28] The quadrillage system in coordination with sweep operations and physical barriers proved successful and by 1958 or late 1959, the French fought the armed wing of FLN to a stalemate.

French diplomatic efforts with neighboring countries failed to stem the flow of arms and personnel from Tunisia into Algeria. In order to disrupt movement across the border and deny sanctuary to FLN fighters in Tunis, the French constructed a barrier between the two countries, called the Morice Line.[29] The barrier consisted of two rows of electrified fencing and barbed wire, separated by minefields and strengthened by radar and blockhouses, it ran south from the coast some 200 miles into the Sahara desert. During the day, scouting planes flew overhead. At night, floodlights lit the line and tanks and armored cars patrolled the perimeter. A mobile force attacked detected breach points.[30] Leaders gave subordinates the ability to interdict targets along the border. In order to facilitate operations, the French resettled approximately 300,000 Algerians away from the border. The land blockade forced the FLN to wage a limited guerilla war with fragmented bands that lacked a sanctuary to rest, train and rearm.

The aggressive French military pursuit of insurgents across the Morice Line cost the French in terms of diplomatic clout within the international community. Several incidents of bombing and excursions into Tunisian territory hurt the legitimacy of French

efforts in Algeria. The best example was the French bombing of Sakiet, a Tunisian city on 8 February 1958. Prior to the bombing of the city, FLN infiltrators ambushed a French patrol and killed fifteen soldiers. The day prior to the bombing of Sakiet, a French spotter plane was shot down by fire coming from the city. The next day a squadron of French B-26s leveled the Sakiet and killed eighty Tunisian civilians at the central market.[31] Tunisian officials immediately escorted foreign journalist to the site to photograph and report on the bombing. The reporting spurred debate in the UN Security Council. The Morice Line succeed by denying the insurgents use of their sanctuary in Tunis, but the barrier flamed international debate and turned the international spot light on France.

Prior to decisive military action, the French decision makers needed to assess the consequences. The French military put their interests ahead of political consequences by constructing the barrier. The leadership failed to implement a public affairs program to mitigate negative reports of border incidents. Counterinsurgent forces must weigh the benefits of constructing a barrier versus public outcry against suppressive methods. These decisions must be made in concert with the civilian authority. In Algeria, the French military represented military and political power. The Morice Line succeeded in denying of support to the FLN, but incidents such as the bombing at Sakiet delegitimized the French efforts to win the support of the population. In an effort to avoid civilian casualties in combat areas, the French military relocated the population.

By 1957, the French military began a systematic relocation effort of the Muslim population from insecure areas. Local commanders resettled civilians in response to local conditions. Local policies turned into national strategy. Commanders implemented the policy in phases. They identified those families and individuals to move based on

military, economic, and social factors.[32] Construction began on facilities and dwellings necessary to accommodate the incoming population. Education classes and propaganda messages promoted French culture. The French tried to impose their culture and values on the Islamic population. The French leadership thought regroupment succeeded by returning the Algerian countryside to its feudal past.[33] During the indoctrination process, French leaders conducted formal ceremonies handing power over to Muslim community leaders adding to the illusion of success. The regroupment in the Blida area offered an example of a successful operation.

The French resettled 300,000 people in the Blida region. They considered it a success and model to follow. They conducted the resettlement from villages and farms into compounds surrounded by barbwire, watchtowers and guard posts. Rebel activity in the area virtually ceased. The authorities in Blida received and money time to develop a well thought out plan. Many regroupment operations were not properly resourced or planned and consequently resulted in the separation of families, inadequate housing and limited economic opportunities for the resettled population.[34] Therefore, the policy alienated many of the 2,000,000 people moved during the war.[35]

The regroupment operations separated the insurgent or guerilla from the population. However, implementation of the policy delegitimized the government's position. In terms of the COIN model, regroupment increased the FLN recruiting efforts, angered the population, and destroyed the trust in government. Mismanagement and poorly conceived execution caused many civilians to seek out the FLN. The guerillas capitalized on government missteps and moved in to offer the disaffected group an alternative to French rule. The French did not consider the Islamic traditions, religion,

and Algerian culture when implementing resettlement operations. The regroupment programs failed because it gave the FLN a resonate message that enabled recruiting and force regeneration efforts. The French achieved military success by 1959, but the failure to consider religious and cultural factors thwarted the military victory.

Conclusion

The French military won the fight in Algeria by adapting doctrine and tactics to the situation. The military started the conflict using conventional find, fix, and finish tactics implemented by Colonel Ducournau and the 25th Airborne Division in early 1957. As the war progressed, the French realized a need to project influence beyond the urban centers. In response, the leadership developed the quadrillage system. The system required large numbers of troops to implement. The French political leaders backed the military's call for more troops because they viewed Algeria as part of France.

The French military tactics defeated the FLN fighters. The FLN needed external support. The French understood this and consequently, built a barrier system enforced with sensors and reaction forces. The Morice Line along the Tunisian border was a successful example of the barrier system. The French stopped logistical support and denied safe haven to the FLN, but physical barriers could not stop FLN propaganda from Cairo. The FLN broadcasted its message, which kept the FLN alive to the Muslim population. The FLN understood the need to increase their legitimacy with the general Muslim population, that is, increase the size of their bubbles in the COIN model.

The COIN model in Figure 1 provides a total system view to difficult problem. The French leadership did not institute reforms and social programs required to integrate a Muslim society into the French culture. The French political leadership turned to the

military to solve the Algerian problem. The military prosecuted the war using their experience in Indochina as a foundation and were guided by an intense desire to reestablish French authority and prestige. The military leadership put victory in front of human rights and freedoms. They believed victory justified any measure necessary to win. The military instituted social programs and reforms, but the program had little appeal to the Islamic population. The French viewed Algeria as a province, not an Islamic country in North Africa. French government, values, and culture did not resonate with the Algerian population. Neglect from France coupled with repression from the colonialist fostered deep feeling of resentment, humiliation, and anger among the Islamic Algerian population.

The Algerian civilian population possessed anger and humiliation based on over one hundred years of subjugation. The feelings of humiliation and anger manifested itself into the FLN. The FLN proved extremely resilient to military attack. The French killed and captured thousands of FLN fighters. The support of the population represented the strategic center of gravity in Algeria. The FLN's message made sense to the unemployed Algerian population with few economic opportunities. The insurgency successfully recruited new members and regenerated itself after each military set back. The population provided the support to the FLN. The Islamic population resented French efforts to impose its culture and beliefs on its population.

The population bubble in the COIN model represented the most important group in the conflict. In his book, *Modern Warfare*, Colonel Roger Trinquier stated, "military schools teaching classic doctrines of warfare rely upon a number of decision factors. But one factor that is essential to the conduct of modern warfare is omitted--the inhabitant."[36]

The French government employed troops, equipment, and resources to fight the battles and enforce policies, but they could not coordinate all elements of national power to compel the Muslim population to accept French rule. The French leadership failed to account for the cultural and religious differences between France and Algeria. By the time the French leadership tried to institute real reforms, they lost legitimacy to implement any change. After a hundred years of occupation, the Algerian population resisted all efforts at reform. Any attempt at reform held little credibility with the Algerian population.

In the end, Algeria was not vital to French national security. The French held an illusion that their culture, values, and religion was the glue holding society together. In reality, the colonialist and the French government imposed their system on a population unwilling to change fundamentally. The loss of Algeria was a set back, but France recovered. To start the recovery process, de Gaulle decided to negotiate peace before the fighting tore France apart. The French won the counterinsurgency battle, but lost the war. The French politicians lost the support of the typical Frenchman. Not even the prestige of de Gaulle could hold off defeat. The war cost France 18,000 dead with over 1,000,000 settlers displaced and the loss of a colonial empire. The Algerians gained independence at the cost of 500,000 casualties and a ruined economic infrastructure and a fragile political system.

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[1]John Talbott, *The War Without a Name-France in Algeria, 1954-1962 (*New York: Random House, 1980), 37.

[2]The French military crushed the FLN's attempt to control the population in Algiers. General Paul Aussaresses' book, *The Battle of the Casbah* gives a first hand account of the torture, mass arrests, and executions conducted by the French during the battle. Reports from Algiers, published in the press initiated the debate about harsh

French tactics. Recent memories of the Nazi occupation fueled the controversy and caused debated between citizens supporting the war and those advocating peace. The debate over torture and other tactics was a factor in de Gaulle's decision to negotiate a peace.

[3]Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars (*Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 84.

[4]Alister Horne, *A Savage War of Peace-Algeria 1954-1962* (USA: History Book Club, 2002), New York: Random House, 1979), 30.

[5]Ibid., 108.

[6]Talbott, 5.

[7]Horne, 165.

[8]The French stronghold at Dien Bien Phu fell on 7 May 1954 and the Algerian War started on 1 November 1954.

[9]For the purposes of this thesis, FLN will be used as an abbreviation to identify the military and political wings of the Algerian insurgency. The movement, its leaders, and the organizational structure changed during the conflict but FLN remains a recognizable organization for the duration of the campaign.

[10]Horne, 42

[11]Ibid., 61.

[12]Talbott, 14.

[13]Horne, 158.

[14]Ibid., 261.

[15]Ibid., 130.

[16]Ibid., 465.

[17]Ibid., 95.

[18]Ibid., 94.

[19]Ibid., 96.

[20]Ibid., 102-3.

[21]Ibid., 105.

[22]Ibid., 108.

[23]Talbott, 117.

[24]David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare-Theory and Practice* (St Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 88.

[25]Horne, 111.

[26]Talbott, 63.

[27]Ibid., 65.

[28]Ibid., 146.

[29]Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare From Indochina to Algeria, The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine (*Princeton University:Praeger Publishers, 1964), 33.

[30]Ibid., 34.

[31]Horne, 250.

[32]Paret, 43.

[33]Ibid., 44.

[34]Horne, 339.

[35]Paret, 44.

[36]Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (*London: Pall Mall Press, Ltd., 1961), 29.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE BOER WAR AND THE FRENCH ALGERIAN WAR

> Without some institutional process or consensus on the importance of subjecting doctrinal tenets, theoretical conclusions, or quantitative effectiveness calculations to honest evidentiary tests, it appears all to easy for military organizations to follow their hopes and dreams into catastrophe.[1]
>
> Williamson Murray, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*

The above quotation is from an essay in the book *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* written by Williamson Murray. Murray describes the importance of applying critical thinking skills to military problems. The military is in constant state of change and adaptation. New technology, social upheavals, and political dynamics force the military to adapt doctrine and tactics. The military must train individuals to be adaptive in order to recognize important changes and take the appropriate action. Historical case studies provide a vehicle to increase critical thinking and adaptive planning skills. If military planners do not use every tool and resource, the organization may "follow their hopes and dreams into catastrophe."

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the change in military doctrine when confronted by a counterinsurgency. The British Boer War and the French insurgency in Algerian provide historical case studies of counterinsurgency principles, doctrine, and tactics. Each case study lends itself to comparison and analysis. This chapter focuses on three issues found in counterinsurgencies conflicts: population control measures, operational tactics, and the civil military operations. There are several reasons for choosing the three topics. Each problem confronts most counterinsurgency operations.

The British and the French changed their doctrines and tactics in different ways to solve each problem. These case studies differ because of time, space, and geography and the counterinsurgency model provides a common framework for analysis.

The COIN model in Figure 1 helps to establish a common reference to compare the different aspects of the British and French counterinsurgency fights. Each bubble at the corners of the triangle represents the key components, which are, insurgents, counterinsurgents, and the people. The forces within the model seek to legitimize their cause. Typically, the counterinsurgency problem distills down to a struggle for the support of the people. The population base provides logistic support, sanctuary, intelligence, and manpower for both government and anti-government forces. All forces interact with each other and expand or contract their sphere of influence, in other words, the size of the bubbles relates to the effectiveness of a program, military operation, or policy decision. Success equals a larger bubble or sphere of influence. Both case studies offer different doctrinal approaches on how to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign.

There are similarities and differences between the British in 1899 and the French military in 1954. The differences are important to identify and acknowledge prior to drawing conclusions. In other words, the confounding variables need to be identified. A confounding variable is an element in the situation that cannot guarantee the end result.[2] In a laboratory, a scientist could factor out the variables to test a hypothesis. In history, the variables are always present. Case studies provide a venue to discuss actions and counteractions with the advantage of hindsight. Therefore, it is necessary to account for the confounding variables to ensure the lessons extracted from history are not distorted

by false assumptions. The confounding variables between England and France are historical context and world stature.

The British in 1899 and the French in 1954 represented colonial powers at different stages of development and influence. By 1900, the British Empire controlled a large colonial empire. The British Navy secured the sea lines of communication for the entire world. The Navy provided protection for commercial vessels at sea which fostered British and European economic prosperity. The British Army guarded the frontier on nearly every continent. The British Army and Navy exported security to the world. The British government was at or near its zenith in terms of colonial possessions and world influence. As discussed by Colonel C.E. Callwell in *Small Wars*, the British military possessed a record of success in India, Africa, and the Middle East. The British government and military assumed the Boers would capitulate to the superiority of the British military. The British military possessed confidence and arrogance and displayed it when dealing with Boer civilians. In contrast, the French military and world influence was in a state of decline.

The French in 1954 were on the downslide as a world power. The French lost Indochina in 1954 and was still recovering from the devastation of the Second World War. The end of World War Two marked the decline of Western colonialism and the rise of nationalism in Africa. Most of France's colonial possessions regained independence by 1954. The French leadership wanted to maintain its influence in the world and they believed losing Algeria would be viewed as another indicator of France's decline. The French claimed Algeria was a province, not just a colony. The politicians wanted to keep Algeria French to retain its last portion of the colonial empire. The French military

needed a victory in Algeria and could not endure another loss. The French military experienced a series of defeats that began in 1940, and continued to Dien Bien Phu in August of 1954. After Dien Bien Phu, the Vietmihn incarcerated many of the French officers who eventually fought in Algeria. The officers felt the humiliation of defeat and prepared themselves to achieve victory at any cost. Therefore, the important variables in the case studies are British confidence and historical success in small wars versus the French experience in the Second World War coupled with the defeat in Indochina. England and France occupied opposite ends of the world political influence and military power spectrum.

The British Analysis

Popular support is critical to success during insurgency operation. As described by Bard O'Neill in *Insurgency and Terrorism,* "That popular support has become a cornerstone of insurgent thinking in this century can be seen in its constant reiteration in one form or another in written and spoken commentaries of countless insurgent leaders."[3] The British did not recognize the significance of popular support. In the Boer War, the British leadership sanctioned the destruction of the civilian support structure to further military gains.[4] The total war concept enabled the military to legitimize the practice of burning farms in search of a way to deprive the Boer commandos their logistical support. The destruction of the farms led to the displacement of entire communities, which lead to the displacement of a whole nation.[5]

The British military established civilian camps in the summer of 1900 to protect civilians sympathetic to the British.[6] The camps started as an ad hoc program. The camps grew in size during Kitchener's drive to clear the land of inhabitants thus depriving

support to the Boer fighters. The internees included a large number of prisoners of war, families of war supporters, and families displaced by the British practice of farm burning.

In 1901, the camps reached a peak of more the 160,000 civilians behind barbwire enclosures.[7] The British placed the camps along the railroad for convenience of supply. However, lack of shelter, clean water, and poor sanitation practices caused disease to ravage the camps. Over a two years period, the conditions in the camps killed approximately 25,000 Boers, mostly women and children.[8]

The British military reacted slowly to improve the condition within the camps. The military failed to develop a plan accommodating the growing number of internees. Military action displaced civilians, but there was no supporting plan to mitigate the follow on effects. When large numbers of displace civilians arrived at the camps, the military did not have the support structure established. Therefore, disease and sickness spread throughout the camps. British humanitarian volunteers, mostly women, discovered and documented the conditions in the camps.[9] The reports reached the British Parliament and newspapers.[10] The public and private outcry criticized the government inability to care for the women and children in the camps and called for immediate improvements.

Emily Hobhouse first visited the South African war zone in early 1901.[11] Upon her return to England, she told reporters and politicians about the conditions in the concentration camps. The information she provided sparked a debate between the conservative and liberal politicians in the British parliament.[12] A serious and divisive debate took place in the British Parliament over the practice of civilian internment. The liberal opposition, led by Lloyd George, used terms like barbarianism and genocide and pointed to the Hague Convention as a standard for war that rallied support against the

camps and the war in general.[13] Supporters of the war, like the Under-Secretary of War, St John Brodrick, argued that camp and farm destruction were necessary measures when facing an opponent who sacrificed everything for victory.[14]

Kitchener improved sanitation, food, and water in the camps due to political pressure from parliament and the Colonial office. By February 1902, the documented death rate in the camps was less than two percent of the population, which was less than the rate in Glasgow, England.[15] The political debate against the camps lost momentum with improved conditions. From a military point of view, the practice of farm burning and relocating civilians separated the Boer commandos from their base of support. Potentially, Kitchener and the military could have suffered a tremendous political set back if he had lost political support in England or, if the Boers successfully used the concentration camp issue to turn world opinion against England. The concentration camp issue did not force an end to the conflict, but the inept planning and implementation by the British cost money and Boer lives. If viewed in terms of the COIN model, the British colonial government lost legitimacy because of poor management and planning. However, the Boer leadership did not have the capacity to take advantage of the British blunder and influence world opinion against the British. The Boers' political machinery was not sophisticated enough to exploit the concentration camp issue. A well thought out population control plan is necessary in counterinsurgency operations. Population control and operational tactics are integrated pieces of a counterinsurgency campaign. The operational tactics developed by the British succeeded against the Boer commandos.

The operational tactic of blockhouse and sweep aimed to drive the Boer guerilla fighters into a net strung out across the South Africa frontier. The British constructed

blockhouse at intervals and laid barbwire between the structures. Kitchener and his advisors planned to divide South Africa into sections by stringing wire from blockhouse to blockhouse.[16] They envisioned a gigantic grid of interlocking obstacles of pillboxes and wire to counter the guerillas mobility and speed. The blockhouse system protected the railroad, impeded commando movement, and provided intelligence.[17]

Kitchener coordinated sweep operation to work with the system of blockhouses. Flying columns scoured the countryside with the intent of trapping the Boers in the grid system of barbwire. The sweeps consisted of massive amounts of manpower moving through zones divided by the blockhouse system in a deliberate and planned fashion. These drives covered miles of territory using thousands of mounted and unmounted soldiers.[18] Boer generals out maneuvered many of these operations, but Kitchener kept at it. The sweeps kept the guerillas moving depriving them of rest, time to refit, and rearm. The drives provided the British with timely intelligence on Boer movements. The flying column sweep operations in coordination with the blockhouse systems limited the Boers mobility and time to regenerate the force.

In 1901, Kitchener added two more innovations to the blockhouse and sweep policy. He incorporated armed native troops in scouting missions for his flying columns and they manned security positions at the blockhouses.[19] Armed black Africans became a visible and alarming presence to the racial prejudice Boers. The Africans added a cheap source of manpower that helped defray mounting war cost. Also, Kitchener instructed his commanders not to bring more families to the concentration camps.[20] Kitchener wanted the Boer fighters to bear the additional burden of supporting their families. The British

government approved both innovations. The concentration camp opposition applauded Kitchener's order and his emphasis on camp sanitation and improvements.

The blockhouse and sweep tactic combined with the increased use of native troops and the rescission of the order to clear families off the land made military operations more difficult for Boer units. Many fighters abandoned the cause and returned home to care for their families. The blockhouse and sweep tactic did not force the Boer leadership to the peace table but it pressured the Boers to peace. The operational environment forced the British to adapt their doctrine. Kinetic operations, like the blockhouse and sweep aimed at killing and capturing the hard-core insurgents, and civil military operations, like population control measures, are necessary to a successful counterinsurgency strategy. Civil military operations impact the population.

In 1900, the British army did not have a civil military unit. The British governed their colonies by using a colonial office and military arm. As British forces occupied the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, Kitchener and Milner believed the Boer army was defeated and final victory was at hand. Roberts, Kitchener, and Milner planned for reconstruction and a return of power to the Boers. Trustworthy Boer officials remained in positions of authority and the British offered amnesty to the entire Boer army minus the key leaders. The British leadership believed most of the Boer commandos would accept amnesty, take the oath of allegiance, and disperse to their homes. The message promoted friendship, trust, and reconciliation. The message failed to influence the Boers. The British needed to craft a civil military message that ensured religious freedom and maintained Boer culture values in order to gain popular support for their objectives. The offer of amnesty and trust did not appeal to the skeptical citizen.

During the operational pause at Bloemfontein, the British leadership encouraged contact between the army and the local population.[21] Kitchener dispatched patrols to the surrounding countryside to spread the message about the amnesty program. The British took over the daily newspapers and replaced the anti-British rhetoric with their message of trust and reconciliation. Rudyard Kipling wrote verse for newspaper, *The Friend,* to boost the morale of his army and give encouragement to the civilians.[22] The British tried to appeal for popular support for their reconstruction efforts, however, the message did not incorporate Boer cultural values and religion.

The British leaders miscalculated the Boers' center of gravity. The British occupation of cities did not defeat the Boer fighters. British occupation and mistreatment of civilians hardened the Boers. The Boer field army was the center of gravity. The Boers were a hardy race of survivors and hunters. The British miscalculated the character of the Boer fighters and supporters. The Boers wanted independence from England and the message of friendly British rule did not resonate with the Boers. Information operations and civil military programs did not increase British legitimacy or expand their bubble in the COIN model. Overall, the British failed at population control and civil military operations, however, the adaptive blockhouse and sweep doctrine achieved success on the battlefields. The success of the kinetic operations outweighed the negative aspects of the concentration camps and the limited civil military operations. Therefore, the British defeated the Boers and achieved a peace settlement on their terms. The French historical context was different, but they faced the same set of problems.

The French Analysis

The French military began population resettlement operations in 1957. It started at the tactical level. Regional commanders recognized the need to relocate Arab civilians to secure areas to facilitate operations. By late 1957, these efforts formed the general policy of regroupment.[23] The regroupment policy cleared areas of the civilian population enabling military commanders to pursue insurgent forces. As in the British Boer War, the military wanted freedom of action on a battlefield free of civilians. Civilians on the battlefield complicated military operations at the tactical level and restricted combined arms operations.

The French military wanted freedom of maneuver. Therefore, adequate resources and time for planning and preparation were afterthoughts. Faulty organization and limited resources caused the French to lose legitimacy and goodwill.[24] The commanders on the ground resettled populations if it supported their military objectives. Poorly constructed camps were fertile recruiting grounds for FLN operatives. By 1959, the French government recognized the shortfalls and ordered the army to cease resettlement operations. However, the French army ignored the order and continued to resettle Algerians until the end of the war.[25] Many resettlement operations had disastrous consequences, however, there were successes.

The French leaders considered the regroupment operation in the Blida region very successful and used it as a model for others to follow.[26] In Blida, area commanders conducted the resettlement from villages and farms in stages in conjunction with a thorough information campaign. Construction started on the facilities prior to the actual relocation of people and the engineers completed the work on schedule. The population

moved into secure compounds surrounded by barbwire, watchtowers and guard posts. Rebel activity in the area virtually ceased. The authorities in Blida received time and money to develop a plan. Many regroupment operations competed for limited resources. Operations executed at low cost resulted in the separation of families, inadequate housing, and limited economic opportunities for the resettled population. Therefore, the policy alienated many of the 2,000,000 people moved during the war.[27]

The regroupment operations separated the guerillas from the population and provided security, support, and services. Well-coordinated resettlement operations increased and legitimized the government's bubble of the COIN model. But due to mismanagement of the program, many civilians sought refuge in the guerilla sphere of influence because of the misery caused by bungled resettlement operations. The guerillas capitalized on government missteps by moving in and recruiting the dissatisfied population. They offered an avenue to attack the government that caused pain and suffering in the resettlement camps. The regroupment programs failed in the aggregate because it caused social and economic disruption to the civilian community and provided the FLN with another example of poor government. France's resettlement efforts failed to address religious and cultural concerns of the Muslim population. Families, clans, and tribes formed the organizational structure of life. Resettlement operations separated families, which created resentment and anger within the population. Therefore, regroupment efforts caused the population to see the French government as the enemy and the insurgency as a friend. In an effort to secure the countryside and bring French military closer to the population, the French experimented with systems or doctrine to improve relations with the population.

In February 1956, the French military developed the quadrillage doctrine that enabled the military to combat and marginalize FLN guerilla activities by late 1958. The quadrillage referred to a system of troop employment designed to maximize the French troop contact with the local Muslim population. The quadrillage system divided Algeria into military zones of control. The system in conjunction with the civil military teams promoted French influence beyond the urban centers. French troops garrisoned near strategic population centers assisted the local police with combating terrorism. In rural areas, they organized around villages and farms to create a local defensive network. They recruited local Arab leaders to assist in resettlement operations, intelligence gathering, and police operations.[28]

Therefore, the quadrillage system created a social and economic bond between the French commander and the local population. The French coordinated civil and military action by creating an administrative hierarchy. The system divided Algeria into military zones further broken into sectors and finally sub-sectors. Most action occurred at the sector level. Within the sectors, French troops garrisoned near strategic population centers assisted the local police with combating terrorism. The troops focused on preventing supplies from reaching the FLN combat troops. In rural areas, commanders organized the quadrillage system around villages and farms to create a local defensive network. The civil military teams created by the French government in the early stages of the war contributed to the success of the quadrillage system. In late 1955, the French General Secretary Soustelle created the Section Administrative Specialists or SAS corps.[29] The SAS teams provided support to the provinces by teaching school, providing

health care, and building infrastructure. The team leader was usually a captain or lieutenant with three to four non-commissioned officers.[30]

SAS teams worked with the local community to determine their needs. The teams resourced projects designed to improve the standard of living in their sector. They coordinated and oversaw building projects. Hospitals and schools provided a service to the rural Arab population. Insurgent activity decreased and government legitimacy increased where SAS teams succeeded. Soustelle's SAS teams improved the quality of life and increased popular support of the government.

The SAS teams worked with the commanders of the quadrillage system in their areas. The SAS officers concentrated on economic and political duties and they provided intelligence to the operational commanders. Many SAS teams strongly identified with their local counterparts and believed the war could be settled by economic aid alone. Some field commanders questioned the SAS team's loyalty.[31] French operational commanders preferred military action to civilian projects. The SAS teams and the quadrillage systems complemented each other and worked best when commanders understood the strengths and weaknesses of each system.

A coordinated counterinsurgency strategy using both the SAS teams and the quadrillage system achieved positive results for the French. Successful SAS teams expanded the government's bubble in the COIN model and the quadrillage system targeted the insurgency. The French government addressed all sides of the COIN model, but failed overall because political dynamics and harsh military tactics eroded the support of the French and Algerian populations over time. France's counterinsurgency strategy failed to address religious and cultural issues of the Algerians. A successful strategy gains

acceptance and a measure of legitimacy from the population. French strategy failed to develop a sustainable program that addressed the needs of the Muslim population.

Conclusion

Counterinsurgency operations are not conducted in a vacuum. The warfare conducted by the British in the Boer Republics and the French in Algeria consisted of series of actions, counteractions, and reactions with each step along the way affecting the population and legitimacy. This chapter analyzed three aspects of counterinsurgency operations: population resettlement, tactical operations, and civil military operations. The government forces adapted their doctrine to counteract insurgent tactics. The British destroyed the source of support and relocated the population. However, the British did not understand the complexity of the task nor the logistic requirements to care for a large number of civilian refugees. Therefore, conditions in the camps deteriorated due to lack of food, water, and unsanitary conditions. The backlash on the home front caused the British to expend resources and time to improve the camps. If the Boer civilian population continued to perish under British control, the military would have been forced to stop operations and fix the civilian problem. The French in Algeria conducted successful resettlement operations when provided time and money. If resources were not allocated, the resettlement was poorly planned and executed resulting in an alienated population ripe for recruitment by the FLN.

The blockhouse, sweep and the quadrillage system demonstrated both powers ability to adapt and modify doctrine when faced with a tough guerilla opponent. The blockhouse contained and limited the Boer commandos mobility that contributed to the British's success in the guerilla phase of the war. France's quadrillage system effectively

destroyed the FLN's ability to conduct large-scale operations on the frontier by late 1958 and early 1959. However, neither system addressed the religious and cultural issues. Each system relied on large troop deployments to pacify the countryside.

In the civil-military operations area, the French codified a system and created SAS teams to promote economic and political projects designed to integrate the Muslim population into the French system. The SAS teams integrated and provided essential services to the Arab rural population. However, many times the teams were not properly trained and equipped. In these situations, the SAS team alienated the civilian population from the French government. Competent SAS team built institutional capacity to sustain governance. The British did not develop a formal system to integrate and pacify the Boer civilians. The British offered amnesty programs and promoted themes of conciliation and trust. The British civil military programs failed. SAS teams and British amnesty programs aimed to co-opt the civilian population. Successful civil military planners use religious understanding and cultural awareness to develop policy. A program will fail if it contradicts religious and cultural values. The British and French civil military operations failed to address religion and culture.

In the end, the British achieved a peaceful settlement with the Boers. The Boer Republics maintained a degree of independence, but the British controlled the seaports, continued to profit from the mines, and gained voting rights for the immigrant population. A holistic view shows a British success. The British operations focused on kinetic solutions, which increased their bubble within the COIN model. In comparison, the population and Boer insurgent bubbles decreased significantly. The French experienced a different ending.

The French people lost confidence in the military and government. The cost of holding Algeria surpassed the benefits. Lost lives, money spent, and the possibility of a military coup convinced de Gaulle to abandon Algeria. The government negotiated a military withdrawal and granted the country independence. Millions of Europeans colonialists migrated to France to escape FLN reprisals. Military commanders wanted to win at all costs. Harsh policies caused the population in France and Algeria to react against the government. The military defeated the insurgency but at a high cost. The political cost exceeded the population's willingness to support the effort and a military withdrawal resulted.

Counterinsurgency operations require commanders to ensure the doctrine and tactics supports the national strategy. In South Africa, the British military wanted to engage the enemy of the field of battle. But the enemy did not think in the same terms. The British adapted their doctrine after a series of defeats to improve their methods of engagement. The French adapted their doctrine but the political forces overcame the military solution. A counterinsurgency conflict requires an integrated political, economic, and military strategy aimed at defeating the insurgent forces. The government's approach must address religious and cultural issues to be sustainable and effective. The COIN model offers a way of thinking about an integrated and coordinated counterinsurgency strategy.

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[1]Williamson Murray, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period,* ed. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 143.

[2]Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars (*New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 28.

[3]Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism-Inside the Modern Revolutionary Warfare (*Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's Inc, 1990), 70.

[4]Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War* (New York: Random House, 1979), 467.

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[6]Denis Judd and Keith Surridge, *The Boer War* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 194.

[7]Ibid., 194.

[8]Ibid., 196.

[9]Pakenham, 532.

[10]Judd and Surridge, 255.

[11]Ibid., 533.

[12]Ibid., 536.

[13]Ibid., 540.

[14]Ibid., 534.

[15]Ibid., 549.

[16]Ibid., 189.

[17]Pakenham, 580.

[18]Ibid., 578.

[19]Ibid., 580.

[20]Ibid., 581.

[21]Ibid., 395.

[22]Ibid., 396.

[23]Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare From Indochina to Algeria, The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine (*Princeton University:Praeger Publishers, 1964), 43.

[24]Alister Horne, *A Savage War of Peace-Algeria, 1954-1962* (USA: History Book Club, 2002), New York: Random House, 1979), 220.

[25]Paret, 45.

[26]Ibid., 44.

[27]Paret, 45.

[28]Ibid., 40.

[29]Horne, 108.

[30]Ibid., 109.

[31]Talbott, 117.

CHAPTER 5

THE BOER WAR AND THE FRENCH ALGERIAN CONFLICT:

LESSONS FOR TODAY

> A nation's first duty is within its borders, but it is not thereby absolved from facing its duties in the world as a whole; and if it refuses to do so, it merely forfeits its right to struggle for a place among the people that shape the destiny of mankind.[1]
>
> Theodore Roosevelt, "The Strenuous Life"

President Roosevelt lived during an era of expansion. He understood the importance of securing the country's borders, but realized the inherent responsibility that comes with world power. At the turn of the 20th Century, America was a growing power, and the US military had conducted military operations in Cuba, Panama, China, Russia, and the Philippines. Since the early 20th Century, the US government has a long history of nation building and foreign intervention. The US Marine Corps' *The Small Wars Manual* originated because of the frequent Corps deployments during the Banana War period. In the manual, the Marine Corps provided information on how to build a government, conduct elections, and establish schools. In his book, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, Max Boot describes the Marine Corps deployments and other American small wars from the Barbary Pirate Wars to Viet Nam. Given the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, counterinsurgency operations and nation building continues to be an option for US policy makers.

Past counterinsurgency conflicts offered an array of complex problems due to environmental considerations, technological advancements, social change, and political realities. History provides US military planners with the background to build an

integrated counterinsurgency strategy for today's environment. In *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine*, Andrew Birtle described the factors of success in a counterinsurgency as coordination between political, diplomatic, and military measures and the interactions between soldiers and the native populations.[2] In other words, a strategic vision smoothly blending the elements of national power executed by competent personnel contributes to success. The British in South Africa and the French in Algeria approached their problem with varying degrees of coordination between the government and military action. The British and French examples offer two striking case studies on civilian military interaction and the relationship between the combatants and the civilian populations.

Like the US military, the British military was the world's super power in 1900. The British Empire stretched across the globe and the British Navy patrolled the seas lanes. The British entered the Boer War with many assumptions about their enemy. They expected a quick victory over the Boers. After a series of difficult fights, the British controlled the major cities, the capital city of Pretoria and the lines of communications, but fighting continued. The Boers lived off the land and continued to resist British intervention. The British military had to deal with eroding support at home due to casualties and a critical news media regarding treatment of civilians on the battlefield. There are many parallels to the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The French Algerian War applies today because of several factors. Algeria and Iraq share the same terrain and weather. The French faced a hostile Muslim population and a culture they did not understand. Although Algeria was a colony for over one hundred years, the French politicians and military did not understand the environment

and the deep feelings of hostility, humiliation, and resentment that the Algerian population held towards the French establishment. The FLN leadership changed over the course of the struggle, but the message remained the same throughout the eight-year struggle. Therefore, the French Algerian War makes for a favorable comparison between Algerian and Iraq.

The purpose of Chapter 5 is to offer insights drawn from the British and French examples that are relevant for the US Army in the current operations. It is not the intent of this chapter to rehash, criticize, or analyze past US military strategy or decisions in Iraq or Afghanistan. It is simply to argue that the British and French lessons learned from their experiences provide relevant historical case studies that are applicable in today's environment.

The differences in society, politics, technology, and terrain make it difficult to adapt the lessons from the counterinsurgency struggles discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. However, it is possible to note the similarities and draw conclusions that provide a baseline for US military planners. Counterinsurgency strategy is the prioritized, coordinated, and integrated effort by all elements of national power against a defined enemy.[3] The framework of an insurgency has not changed significantly from Mao Tse Tung to Osama Bin Laden. The insurgent movement requires a unifying cause and support.[4] The population provides support through logistics, manpower, and intelligence. Government forces succeed by using direct and indirect military action, information operations aimed at undermining the insurgency, and political action to isolate the insurgent and build legitimacy.[5] A successful counterinsurgency strategy blends kinetic

and non-kinetic tactics and policies. In many instances, British arrogance and false assumptions derailed their efforts to bring peace and stability to the Boer Republics.

The British failed to plan or anticipate the population control and resettlement requirement resulting from the guerilla warfare in South Africa. The camps protected Boer sympathizers, or coerced Boer fighters, to surrender by imprisoning their families. Women and children died in the camps as a result of poor care and lack of basic needs. When reports of casualty figures and conditions within the camps reached London, public and political outcry rose to a level that forced the military to clean up the camps.[6]

The British resettlement operations exemplify the how of poor planning, attitude, and lack of funding can negatively impact a mission's success. Kitchener and the top military leaders focused on finding, fixing, finishing the Boer fighters rather than providing for refugees. In order to concentrate on military functions, Kitchener proposed civilian officials assume responsibilities for the camp administration. By December 1901, Milner, the Colonial Secretary took over day-to-day operations at the camps and Kitchener ordered his field commander to discontinue the relocation of women and children to the camps.[7] The culture within the British army in the field focused on military operations not the care for civilians on the battlefield.[8] The British military leaders with Kitchener at the top, failed to resource non-military operations. Resettlement operations and the transition from offensive operations to counterinsurgency and support operations must be thought out, planned and rehearsed well in advance of execution in order to avoid the problems experienced by the British in 1900. In 1900, it was not feasible to expect military officers to think in terms of the COIN model. The relationship between combatant and non-combatants existed, but the contemporary military minds at

the time focused on killing the enemy and occupying terrain, not caring for the refugee population.

Support operations and counterinsurgency warfare requires detailed interaction with the indigenous population. The British example shows the need to allocate time, money, troops, and other resources to resettlement operations. The expertise exists within the US government to assist military commanders to solve population control problems. Many non-governmental organizations work daily with displaced persons. Agencies within the US government help plan and coordinate refugee relief. Military planners can use this network of expertise to plan, coordinate, and execute a successful population resettlement operation. US military planners must seek out and solicit information from a wide variety of sources before executing relocation operations. For future operations, US military planners must adequately forecast, plan, resource and execute civilian relocation operation. The military must recognize change in the operational environment, for example a refugee crisis or a fundamental change in the nature of the conflict. The British were slow to recognize the transition from conventional military operations to guerilla or irregular warfare.

By the spring of 1900, the Boer leadership decided to abandon conventional tactics and begin a guerilla campaign to achieve their goals.[9] The Boer commandos forced the British into a scenario for which they were unprepared. The British measured success by controlling terrain and occupying cities. However, the occupation of Pretoria did not end the fighting. The British adapted their doctrine and tactics to defeat the Boers. Likewise, in Iraq, the US military planned and executed a conventional offensive strike for Baghdad, but failed to plan for civilian unrest and terrorist activity.

In response to the changing operational environment, the British developed techniques and doctrines aimed at containing and impeding the mobility of the Boer columns. They devised a plan to trap the guerillas using barbwire and blockhouses.[10] They divided South Africa into sections by stringing wire from blockhouse to blockhouse. A giant grid of interlocking obstacles countered the Boer's mobility and speed. The blockhouse system protected infrastructure, impeded movement, and provided intelligence. The blockhouses in conjunction with large sweep operations struck decisive blows to the Boer guerillas.

The US military planners should implement a similar effort to contain the Iraqi insurgents. The US military must devise plans to contain the insurgents. The British deployed about 300,000 troops to South Africa. An effective blockhouse and sweep operation in Iraq would require more troops than currently available. Advanced technology, Iraqi troops, and other coalition partners must combine efforts and create the same type of effect as the blockhouse and sweep method. Containment, separation, and capture of guerillas are necessary to break the will of the insurgency. In addition to kinetic operations, the British used civil affairs operations in South Africa.

The British military did not train or employ civil affairs personnel. The commander and their colonial office counterparts conducted civil military operations. However, the British did possess experience in conducting colonial affairs and developed an interagency system to govern their colonies. For example, in South Africa, the British General Secretary Sir Alfred Milner, in addition to his civilian responsibilities, oversaw military operations, recommended troop levels, and discussed employment options with the military commanders. British civilian and military officials developed a relationship

oriented towards a common goal. The relationship was not always harmonious, however, both sides recognized the need to work together to meet national objectives. Cooperation between the civilian and military agencies is a critical component to a comprehensive COIN strategy. Carl von Clausewitz wrote "war is not merely an act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."[11] Many argue Clausewitz' statement advocates political and military cooperation and integration, as opposed to the view that military commanders serve their political masters. In counterinsurgency operations, elements of national power must be synchronized, coordinated and integrated to create the synergy necessary to defeat the opponent.

For example, during the occupation of the Orange Free State capital, Bloemfontein, civilian and military authorities began an amnesty program. They set up a hotline program to gather intelligence from civilians. The US military in Iraq is using civil affairs personnel to plan infrastructure projects, develop local governance, and improve the schools. Amnesty programs were unsuccessful South Africa and would fail in Iraq because the insurgents perceive their cause as just and amnesty implies fault. The British succeed in South Africa because of civilian and military cooperation and they brought overwhelming combat power against the Boer armies. The British created a counterinsurgency campaign in response to the Boer's transition from conventional to guerilla warfare.

The British military adapted their doctrine to combat the characteristics of the Boer insurgency. The British used population resettlement operations, blockhouse and sweep operations, and civil military operations to cause the Boer fighters to capitulate.

The British experienced successes and failures. In the case of the population control camps, Britain's arrogance, disregard for Boer civilians, and false assumptions caused pain, suffering, and death to innocent civilians. Proper planning, cultural awareness, and leadership could have overcome the problems within the camps. When reports of the conditions within the camps reached England, pressure from Parliament compelled the military to apply resources to correct the terrible conditions in the camps. The blockhouse and sweep operations limited the Boer commandos mobility and were generally successful. The British civil military operations were less than successful due to many factors previously discussed. When the COIN model is applied to the overall counterinsurgency strategy in South Africa, the British focused on kinetic operations with a secondary effort on legitimizing the British cause. They succeeded because of overwhelming British combat power and the Boers' inability to regenerate strength. In Algeria, the French faced an insurgency of a different nature. Social inequities, cultural differences, and religious beliefs motivated a dedicated segment of the Algerian population to fight for freedom from France. The French had an overwhelming military superiority but did not win the fight politically in Algeria.

Relocating civilians from the battlefield is a difficult process with many inherent problem and few easy solutions. The French military in Algeria moved thousands of civilians away from the border regions to ensure their safety and enabled the military the freedom of maneuver. However, unplanned, or poorly executed, relocation operations increased distrust, caused fear and suffering among the population. The French authorities disregarded religious and cultural issues during resettlement operations. Splitting families and not providing religious opportunities created strong anti-French

feelings. Those feelings against the government translated into anger and humiliation that fostered the insurgency. The FLN capitalized on the French blunders to communicate to the population a message that resonated with the Muslim population.

The French conducted resettlement operations under the doctrine of regroupment. Many operations were successful and safely removed the Arab civilians from insecure areas. Unfortunately, too many times, poor planning and unrealistic timetables exacerbated the mismanagement and mistreatment of civilians. The resentment toward the French military and humiliation experienced by many civilians during regroupment operations legitimized the rebel's cause and promoted the FLN's recruiting effort. Well-planned and resourced resettlement operations fostered legitimacy for the government. As a result, the French conducted several successful resettlement operations.

The French military conducted a successful resettlement operation in the Blida region. They succeeded because authorities received money, resources, and time to develop a plan, inform the population, and build the infrastructure. However, the French could not sustain the investment made at Blida for every resettlement. Many regroupment operations were not properly resourced and consequently resulted in the separation of families, inadequate housing, and limited economic opportunities for the resettled population.[12] The negative feelings created by haphazard resettlement delegitimized the government and provided opportunities for the insurgents to exploit. Many French resettlement operations provide examples of failure.

When the US military must relocate civilians, planners need to examine the example of the French at Blida. The higher command must allocate time, resources, and money to plan and execute civilian resettlement for a successful operation. The time

factor is particularly important. Resources and money are limited, however, these factors can be massed if given enough time and priority. Poorly planned and executed resettlement operations create feelings of hatred, resentment, and humiliation that foster the insurgents' cause. If people are humiliated and downtrodden by the government, insurgents gain legitimacy and support. After relocating the Arab population, the French searched for a military doctrine to further separate the FLN guerillas from the population. They developed a system called the quadrillage doctrine.

The quadrillage system divided Algeria into military zones.[13] Within each zone, French garrisoned troops near strategic population centers to assist the local police with combating terrorism. The troops focused on preventing supplies and arms from reaching the FLN fighters. In rural areas, they organized around villages and farms to create a local defensive network. They recruited local Muslim leaders to assist in resettlement operations, intelligence gathering, and police operations against local insurgents. The French used a quick reaction force to act on intelligence gathered. They held intervention troops in reserve. The quadrillage system required large numbers of troops and a sophisticated logistic system. The French deployed 300,000 troops in support of the quadrillage doctrine. The quadrillage system and other methods like the Morice Line proved successful and the French fought the FLN to a stalemate by late 1958 and early 1959. The quadrillage system provides a model for US forces.

The US planners need to examine the merits of a system similar to the quadrillage. The intervention force provided the local commander with a battalion sized force capable of interdicting insurgents. Intervention forces worked for area commanders and responded to intelligence tips within the zone. The intervention force crossed unit

boundaries and quickly reacted to a developing situation. The French command and control system embedded in the quadrillage facilitated the rapid employment of combat forces. The zone commander controlled three to four hundred mobile troops designated as intervention forces.[14] Today, the term quick reaction force replaces intervention force.

In Iraq, the US commanders organize their quick reaction forces from within the brigade combat team and it is typically a platoon-sized element.[15] In contrast, the French commanders had a battalion-sized element available to interdict insurgents. The close coordination developed between French garrison and intervention troops proved effective. A battalion possesses more lethality and gives a commander more options when fighting an insurgent force. A larger quick reaction force gives US commanders more flexibility to engage the insurgents. Flexibility and integration enabled France to defeat the FLN insurgency.

In Algeria, the French developed a system to integrate French troops into the local culture. The Colonial Secretary Jacques Soustelle created the Section Administrative Specialists or SAS corps. A SAS team typically consisted of a captain or lieutenant with three to four non-commissioned officers. Their mission was to interact with Arabs at the lowest level. The SAS teams provided administration support for the provinces, teaching, health care, built houses and hospitals.

The successful teams improved the quality of life in the provinces they worked. SAS teams worked with the local community to determine their needs and resourced specific projects designed to improve the standard of living. Captain David Galula served in Algeria from 1956-1958 mostly in the Aures region. During his time in command, he received instruction from his commander, LtCol Lemoine to hire as many Algerian men

as possible. He used employment as economic incentive to keep the young male population away from FLN influence.[16] Economic incentives increased the government's goodwill and sapped the strength from the insurgents' cause.

The education of Arab young people received priority and the SAS teams built many schools. The school building program doubled in 1956 and agricultural reform received priority funding.[17] Hospitals and schools provided a needed service to the rural Arab population. As a result of the building programs, insurgent activity decreased and the level of government legitimacy increased where SAS teams succeeded. Soustelle's SAS concept directly worked to strengthen the government's legitimacy and persuaded the population to support the government. The SAS teams formed the nucleus of the French civil military strategy whose aim focused on improving relations with the Algerian civilian population. In terms of the COIN model, civil military operations cultivated support from the population. Popular support manifested itself by increased participation in the French programs and decreased support to the insurgents. However, the French failed to incorporate religious and cultural aspects into the SAS programs.

Counterinsurgency doctrine must incorporate simple, sustainable, and responsive civil military programs. An overall counterinsurgency strategy requires the flexibility to execute kinetic operations when appropriate and perform other operations as necessary to foster civilian support and build legitimacy. The French and British campaigns executed a wide variety of military, security, reconstruction, and stability operations. The British and French case studies provided different and unique perspectives on counterinsurgency operations. The study of military history does not provide a checklist to conduct present

day operations. Rather, geography, culture, and past experiences provide a frame of reference to plan current operations.

In South Africa and Algeria, technology, terrain, orientation, and doctrine vary in each situation. Yet, after stripping away the variables, each conflict presented the government forces with a similar problem. During counterinsurgency warfare, population resettlement occurred when counterinsurgency forces want to operate unimpeded by civilians. Unsuccessful operations led to feelings of hostility, resentment, and humiliation among the populations. The British and French examples proved manpower, resources and time must be allocated to a resettlement operation. Citizens did not want to leave their home. Therefore, the government needs to institute an information campaign to justify the resettlement within the cultural and religious framework of the population. Resettlement operations increased legitimacy within the COIN model construct when conducted properly. The British did not plan or resource the resettlement operations and their approach resulted in widespread death, condemnation at home, decreased legitimacy in South Africa. The military moved to correct the problems, but only after the problems surfaced. Likewise in Algeria, the French moved thousand of people into camps away from the border regions. The French, much like the British, did not address the suffering in the camps until the problems surfaced. Inept military operations lost legitimacy for the government. Non-kinetic operations require planning and must consider the cultural and religious aspects. Non-kinetic operations focus on the population while kinetic operations focus on destroying the insurgent.

The British blockhouse, sweep method and the French quadrillage system separated the insurgent from their supporters. However, the implementation required

massive troop deployments. In the French case, nearly 400,000 troops, mostly draftees, manned the quadrillage network.[18] In the British example, over 250,000 troops deployed to the Boer Republics.[19] The US military does not have enough troops to deploy a large army in the field and meet its other national security commitments, nor is it likely that the American public will tolerate large troop deployments. The US government must leverage other resources. If we continue to conduct nation-building operations, it is imperative to gain the support of coalition partners. The large scale British and French deployments reinforce Galula's statement that a ten to one troop ratio is necessary for successful counterinsurgency operations.[20] The quadrillage system quelled the FLN by late 1958 and early 1959. Boer commandos were ineffective by 1901 in large part due to the block house and sweep operations. The British and French examples of counterinsurgency strategy call for large troop deployments. If the US military were to implement either example, more troops are necessary to achieve success.

The successes of the SAS teams in Algeria demonstrate the requirement to implement civil affairs into counterinsurgency operations. The US military understands the need for integration civil affairs into the plan. The danger arises from inadequate numbers of trained of civil affairs personnel. Inept SAS teams in Algeria contributed to the resentment and anger of the civilian population. Poorly trained SAS teams quickly lost the support of the indigenous people. One bad experience affects more than just one family. Families are affiliated with tribes and clans. The entire tribe is offended if one family is mistreated. A poor civil affairs plan can rapidly alienate an entire tribe of personnel.

The questions to ask is how can the US implement a counterinsurgency strategy that requires large numbers of troops to provide security and help with reconstruction? The answer is to the reorganize the US Army. A counterinsurgent force requires strike and security forces complemented by reconstruction forces. Thomas Barnett advocates a similar type structure in *The Pentagon's New Map*. Simply put, he argued for a lethal strike force to deter and preempt threats and a separate security, stability, and reconstruction force to secure and generate institutional capacity in post war operations.[21] As supported by the British and French case studies, counterinsurgency operations require a new doctrine and organization. Each military adapted its doctrine and reorganized the force to combat the insurgents.

The US military needs to incorporate a "Political Military Officer" to facilitate planning and coordinate efforts between the Department of Defense and other government entities. The interagency problem existed in South Africa, Algeria, and Iraq. Stephen Biddle and Bard O'Neill agreed that the coordination and application of governmental power is the most decisive element in insurgency conflicts.[22] Currently, the system is not designed to link political and military objectives. For example, General Norman Schwarzkopf negotiated the peace treaty at the end of the Gulf War and Department of State officials were not present at the negotiations. A trained, Political Military Officer bridges the cultural gap between the civilian and military organizations. The Political Military Officer links political strategy to military reality. If the political strategy does not match the military capability, the Political Military Officer articulates the gaps and offers alternatives.

The US military needs to incorporate new training techniques and mission standards. Counterinsurgency training is difficult to run through a computer simulation. The US military must break out of the Cold War mentality and the binary system of decision-making. Counterinsurgency operations require time and patience. Counterinsurgent leaders need to learn adaptive leadership techniques and thrive in ambiguous situations. Strong leadership is the key to success in counterinsurgency operations. The US military should return to mission type orders that allow and encourage initiative. General George Patton's Third Army directives guiding the Battle of the Bulge averaged about two to three pages in length per day. Mission type orders work best in counterinsurgency operations. Micro management and risk aversion led to failure.

The British and French adapted their doctrine, reorganized their forces, and encouraged initiative from subordinates. Military planners should incorporate the lessons of the past into future plans to remove some of the friction described by Clausewitz. Fog and friction are inherent in military operations and especially counterinsurgency operations. Geography, culture, religion and past experiences are a good barometer to guide planning for the future. Military planners should use all the resources at hand to increase the chance of military success. There are to many uncontrollable variables in military operations. Prudent and successful planners use all information available when developing a course of action. Commanders are ultimate responsible, they must force their staffs to use all available assets and tools at their disposal, including history.

The British and French counterinsurgency campaigns do not provide a checklist or roadmap for success. Case study analysis shows that government forces that adapt their doctrine achieve success. The British and French armies trained to fight

conventional wars, yet they found themselves fighting an elusive, resilient enemy. Their doctrine failed to provide guidance on how to fight a guerilla war. Both militaries adapted their doctrine to the environment. The COIN model provides a framework for US military officers to begin planning counterinsurgency operations. The British and French campaigns revealed the necessity to adapt doctrine. Rarely, does a military start a war with the right doctrine. In fact, the side that adapts fastest to the contemporary environment usually achieves success. For the foreseeable future, the US military will engage in counterinsurgency operations and small wars. The British and French case studies confirm the importance of flexible and adaptable doctrine. A successful counterinsurgency strategy incorporates historical lessons, elements of national power and adapts the principles of war to create flexible doctrine within the contemporary environment. US military planners must adhere to this framework to craft successful plans that enable US forces to defeat the enemy. Military plans must describe the enemy, develop strategy, and publish mission orders that allow the force to be agile, flexible, and adaptive.

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[1]Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace (*New York: Basic Books, 2002), 350.

[2]Andrew Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941 (*Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998), 4.

[3]Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism-Inside the Modern Revolutionary Warfare (*Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's Inc, 1990), 125.

[4]David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practise (*St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 18.

[5]Ibid., 65-69.

[6]Denis Judd and Keith Surridge, *The Boer War* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 194.

[7]Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War (*New York: Random House, 1979), 581.

[8]Ibid., 523.

[9]Ibid., 408.

[10]Judd and Surridge, 189.

[11]Carl von Clausewitz, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, *On War* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

[12]Alister Horne, *A Savage War of Peace-Algeria, 1954-1962* (New York: History Book Club, 2002), 339.

[13]John Talbott, *The War Without a Name-France in Algeria, 1954-1962 (*New York: Random House, 1980), 63.

[14]Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (*London: Pall Mall Press, Ltd., 1961), 76.

[15]MAJ Barrett Bernard spent 12 months in Iraq with the First Infantry Division from April 2004 to April 2005. He worked in a variety of positions at the battalion and brigade level. In his experience, each brigade combat team organized its own reserve element for quick reaction duties, that element was usually a platoon in strength.

[16]David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958,* RAND Study, 154.

[17]Horne, 108.

[18]Talbott, 65.

[19]Pakenham, 605.

[20]Galula, 32.

[21]Thomas Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map* (New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 2004), 303.

[22]Birtle, 4; O'Neill, 125.

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